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Protecting the Public Fisc: 
Fighting Accrual Abuse with Section 446 Discretion 
Tax avoidance through accounting method manipulation has long 
plagued the income tax system. Section 446(b) of the current Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954 (the Code) is designed to combat such manipulations by requir- 
ing that accounting methods used for income tax reporting "clearly reflect 
income."' But judicial application of this test has been c o n f ~ s e d . ~  Though the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the Commissioner of Internal Reve- 
nue may determine as a matter of agency discretion whether a given account- 
ing application clearly reflects incomeY3 the source and nature of this grant of 
discretion have been left ambiguous. Also, the practical meaning of the 
"clearly reflect income" language has never been articulated. Courts have 
relied on section 446(b) to disallow manipulations of cash method account- 
ingY4 but no court has squarely addressed the potential for accrual accounting 
manip~lation.~ Uncertainty about the application of section 446(b) to accrual 
accounting has left the door open to manipulation. 
This Note suggests an approach under the current Code and current legal 
doctrine that would enable the Commissioner to disallow accrual accounting 
when manipulated to avoid taxation. At the outset, the Note defines and 
illustrates tax avoidance through accounting manipulation. The Note then 
considers within the framework of judicial review of agency action the source 
and nature of the Commissioner's discretion to reject accounting methods. 
This analysis demonstrates the validity of the Commissioner's action when- 
ever it is based on legally relevant factors. The Note then develops the emerg- 
ing content of the "clearly reflect income" language as the source of the 
legally relevant factors, and concludes that the relationship between the no- 
tion of "income" and taxation according to ability to pay supports the 
Commissioner's rejection of an accounting method manipulated to avoid 
normal payment of tax. 
1. I.R.C. 5 446(b) (1976). 
2. Note the current conflict between the Court of Claims and the Fifth Circuit over thc 
deductibility of tax shelter farmers' prepaid feed expenses, challenged by the Commissioner under 
5 446(b). Compare Clement v. United States, 580 F.2d 422 (Ct. C1. 1978) (deduction denied), with 
Frysinger v. Commissioner, 645 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1981) (deduction allowed). 
3. Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 532-33 (1979), and cases cited 
therein. 
4. E.g., Ferrill v. Commissioner, 684 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1982); Burck v. Commissioner, 533 
F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1976). 
5. When confronted with such an accrual accounting manipulation in Mooney Aircraft, Inc. 
v. United States, 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1969), the Fifth Circuit disallowed the accounting practice 
under § 446@), but did not properly identify the manner in which accrual accounting was being 
manipulated. See discussion infra notes 37-42 & 170-71 and accompanying text. 
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A. Avoidance Abuse Defined 
Implicit in a system of income taxation is the goal of vertical e q ~ i t y . ~  
Vertical equity requires that those with greater ability to pay tax pay a higher 
tax. Equally necessary to an economically workable system of income taxation 
are the goals of horizontal equity and economic efficiency.' Horizontal equity 
requires that similarly situated taxpayers pay an equal tax. If horizontal equity 
is defeated, vertical equity will also be defeated.8 Economic efficiency requires 
that the tax system not favor one equally economically efficient transaction 
over an0ther.O If similarly situated taxpayers pay different taxes, the transac- 
tion yielding the lower tax becomes artificially favored, thereby defeating free 
market economic efficiency. Of course, all three goals are considerably modi- 
fied by tax incentive provisions of the Code, which intentionally distort free 
market efficiency as well as vertical and horizontal equity in order to encour- 
age certain activities. For the purposes of this Note, the calculus of vertical 
equity, horizontal equity, and efficiency as fnodified by intentional subsidy 
provisions will be referred to as "tax equity." 
Within this framework, a tax shelter may be defined as any transaction 
that reduces current income tax without reducing the taxpayer's actual wealth 
and, by implication, without reducing his current ability to pay tax.1° Not all 
tax shelters are "abusive." If the activity giving rise to the tax reduction is the 
intended recipient of a tax subsidy, the reduction in taxes is simply the 
government's way of paying the subsidy." 
Consider a transaction that, after applying all the rules of the taxpayer's 
usual book accounting method, results in a decrease in his tax for the current 
year. Such a transaction might actually have decreased the taxpayer's ability 
to pay tax, in which case the reduction in tax does not defeat tax equity.12 
Alternatively, the transaction might not decrease the taxpayer's ability to pay 
tax, or might cause a decrease in tax disproportionate to the decrease in 
taxpaying ability. If so, the transaction is a "tax shelter." Assuming that the 
tax benefits are the result of activities qualifying for an intentional tax sub- 
sidy, tax equity is not defeated; the goals of vertical and horizontal equity are 
sacrificed to serve governmental policy considered more important. If, on the 
other hand, a transaction reduces the tax without reducing ability to pay and 
is not a transaction for which a tax subsidy was intended, tax equity is 
6 .  R. Musgrave & P. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice 235 (1980). 
7. Id. 
8. Horizontal equity is intertwined with vertical equity, since, if similarly situated taxpayers 
pay a different tax, vertical equity is destroyed. The taxpayer paying less than those similarly 
situated must be paying the same as some other taxpayer less able to pay the tax, so that the tax is 
no longer proportional to ability to pay. 
9. R. Musgrave & P. Musgrave, supra note 6, at 235. 
10. See Shefsky, Take the Helter out of Shelter, 58 Taxes 299, 300-01 (1980). 
11. Id.; R. Musgrave & P. Musgrave, supra note 6, at 358. 
12. This transaction is not a tax shelter, since actual wealth is decreased. 
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defeated. The latter situation-a transaction that avoids payment of taxes 
according to taxpaying ability without participation in a tax-favored activity- 
can be defined as tax avoidance abuse.13 This definition does not consider 
intent: the same form of transaction may be entered into by one taxpayer to 
avoid taxes and by another for nontax economic reasons.I4 Adherence to the 
taxpayer's regular book accounting method15 may require the taxpayer to 
claim unsought tax benefits. To the extent that the avoidance-motivated 
taxpayer and the innocent taxpayer remain equally able to pay tax, however, 
tax equity does not require the law to discriminate between them on the basis 
of intent.l8 
B. Accrual Accounting as Abusive 
1 .  Can an Accounting Method Be Abused? Both cash and accrual meth- 
ods are specifically authorized by section 446(c) of the Code for computation 
of taxable income.17 Given that the Code ultimately defines tax "income" in 
terms of the tax accounting method used, the possibility that the proper 
application of an authorized accounting method could be an abuse not prop- 
erly reflecting income seems puzzling. Yet section 446(b) contemplates exactly 
that possibility in providing that "if the [accounting] method used does not 
clearly reflect income, the computation of taxable income shall be made under 
such method as, in the opinion of the [Commissioner], does clearly reflect 
income."18 This provision expressly applies to the accounting methods autho- 
13. This Note does not attempt to deal with the possible abuse situation in which the 
taxpayer tries to  take disproportionate advantage of intended tax subsidies. 
14. Compare the rent-accrual shelter discussed infra text accompanying notes 26-27 with the 
rent payment arranged by the taxpayer in Grand Ave. Motor Co. v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 
423 (D. Minn. 1954). 
15. "Taxable income shall be computed under the method of accounting on the basis of 
which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books." I.R.C. 5 446(a) (1976). 
16. On the irrelevance of tax-avoidance intent to the question of abuse, see Frysinger v. 
Commissioner, 645 F.2d 523,527-28 (5th Cir. 1981) (treasurer of U.S. Steel Corporation claimed 
a large deduction for prepaid feed in a cattle management syndicate; despite the taxpayer's 
evident intent to avoid taxes the court found sufficient "business purpose" to qualify for special 
treatment given by the Treasury Regulations to farmers); Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 
(2d Cir. 1934) ("[A] transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its 
immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid . . . taxation."), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
17. "[A] taxpayer may compute taxable income under any of the following methods of 
accounting-(1) the cash receipts and disbursements method; (2) an accrual method . . . ." I.R.C. 
5 446(c) (1976). 
The regulations define these accounting methods as follows: 
(i) Cash receipts and disbursements method. Generally, under the cash receipts and 
disbursements method in the computation of taxable income, all items which constitute 
gross income (whether in the form of cash, property, or services) are to be included for 
the taxable year in which actually or constructively received. Expenditures are to be 
deducted for the taxable year in which actually made . . . . 
(ii) Accrualmethod. Generally, under an accrual method, income is to be included 
for the taxable year when all the events have occurred which fix the right to receive such 
income and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy. Under such 
a method, deductions are allowable for the taxable year in which all the events have 
occurred which establish the fact of the liability giving rise to such deduction and the 
amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy. 
Treas. Reg. 5 1.446-l(c)(l) (1957). 
18. I.R.C. 3 446(b) (1976). 
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rized in section 446(c).lQ In addition, because relative ability to pay may not be 
definable by any particular set of accounting rules, a tax system based on 
ability to pay will not be served in every situation by a specific accounting 
method. Since the accounting rules are designed to reflect taxpaying ability in 
the ordinary situation, unusual circumstances affecting taxpaying ability 
might not be considered. Where the inherent inaccuracies of an accounting 
method are exploited through the structuring of transactions, tax liability will 
not reflect taxpaying ability, tax equity is defeated, and the accounting 
method may be said to be abused. Case law on cash method accounting under 
section 446(b) amply supports the contention that an accounting method may 
be abused. The weakness of cash accounting is that no attempt is made to 
match revenues and expenses; the taxpayer has broad discretion in the timing 
of deductions. Thus, the cash rules allow a current deduction for expenses 
paid even though the associated income is not currently recognized. Alterna- 
tively, future expenses may be paid and deducted currently without capitaliz- 
ing their value.20 Such current deductions permit the taxpayer to take advan- 
tage of the time value of deferred taxes and are susceptible to disallowance. 
Circuit courts have rejected these cash method deductions. These courts 
have relied on the evolving rule that the determination that an accounting 
method does not "clearly reflect income" under section 446(b) is a matter for 
the discretion of the Commi~sioner.~~ Where transactions are structured to 
take advantage of the cash method's inaccuracies by providing for extraordi- 
nary expense prepayments, courts usually are quick to uphold a Commission- 
er's determination that income is not clearly reflected. In Burck v. Commis- 
~ i o n e r , ~ ~  the Second Circuit upheld such a determination where the cash 
method taxpayer had prepaid $300,000 of interest on a five-year loan in order 
to offset a $900,000 capita1 gain in the tax year. The court held that "prepaid 
interest expense, just as in the case of any other substantial prepaid item, may, 
in individual situations, appropriately be recognized by the Commissioner as 
an item which materially distorts the reporting and taxation of a cash basis 
taxpayer's income."23 The Burck court's disallowance of cash accounting for 
19. Section 446(c), aurnorizing the cash method and the accrual method, is "[slubject to the 
provisions of subsection[] . . . (b)." I.R.C. 8 446(c) (1976). 
LO. But see Treas. Reg. 8 1.461-l(a)(l) (1957) (deduction denied where asset had useful life 
extending beyond taxable year in which asset was created). 
21. See discussion of Commissioner's discretion infra text accompanying notes 51-119. 
22. 533 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1976). 
23. Id. at 773. It should be noted that the "materially distort income" language derives from 
Treas. Reg. 8 1.461-l(a)(3)(i) (1957), dealing with items that "overlap" taxable years. Since 8 461 
does not expressly mention this concept, but implicitly incorporates 8 446 through its reference to 
taxpayer's accounting method, this language would seem to be a rephrasing of the "clearly reflect 
income" test of 5 446(b). See generally discussion of "clearly reflect income" infra text accompa- 
. . 
nying notes 120-59. 
- 
In accord with Burck are Ferrill v. Commissioner. 684 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1982) {DreDaid 
. .A - 
interest); Cole v. Commissioner, 586 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. '1978) (same); sandor v. Commissioner, 
536 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1976) (same); Keller v. Commissioner. 79 T.C. 2 (1982) (prepaid intangible 
drilling costs). Section 461(g), added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 1520, codifies this 
case law by requiring cash method taxpayers to capitalize prepaid interest. I.R.C. 8 461(g) (1976). 
Compare Clement v. United States, 580 F.2d 422 (Ct. C1. 1978) (prepaid feed deduction denied), 
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a transaction that exploits cash accounting's weakness has not yet been ex- 
tended to the disallowance of accrual accounting for transactions exploiting 
its rules to avoid taxes. 
2. Accrual Accounting Distortion. Accrual accounting's weakness is its 
failure to take into account the time value of money. As interest rates have 
skyrocketed, the potential for real profit by manipulation of this shortcoming 
of accrual accounting has increased. 
Consider the situation of two taxpayers, A and B, each running an 
identical service business and keeping his books on the accrual basis. Each 
rents identical premises and each has net income for the year, before any 
deduction for rent, of $20,000. Taxpayer A has a lease that provides for 
$6,000 annual rent, payable on January 15th following each year. "All 
events" having occurred to fix the liability, and the amount being "reasonably 
determinable," the Treasury Regulations (Regulations) permit deduction of 
the expense,24 and A duly accrues as payable the $6,000 rent for the year in 
filing a return for the year ended December 31st, reporting net income of 
$14,000. B is a more aggressive taxpayer. He has arranged for a lease under 
which rent for the year is due in the amount of $15,000, payable ten years 
after the close of the taxable year. On January 15th of the next year he 
purchases $6,000 worth of tax free bonds yielding ten percent, knowing that in 
ten years this sinking fund will equal the $15,000 needed to pay the accrued 
rent obligation. On his tax return for the year ended December 31st, B accrues 
the entire amount of the $15,000 rent due in ten years, since "all events" have 
occurred that fix the fact of his liability and the amount of the liability is 
precisely determinable. B reports $5,000 of income for the year, while A 
reports $14,000, even though their taxpaying abilities are identicaLZ5 Thus, by 
manipulation of the weakness of accrual accounting-the failure to consider 
the time value of money-B is able to defeat horizontal equity unless the Code 
provides a remedy. 
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907 (1979), with Frysinger v. Commissioner, 645 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(prepaid feed not disallowable as against authorization in Treasury Regulations). 
24. The "all events" and "amount reasonably determinable" criteria are the two prongs of 
the test for timing of an accrual deduction. Treas. Reg. 8 1.461-1(a)(2) (1957); United States v. 
Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 (1926). 
25. If anything, B is in a better position to pay tax, since he has greater liquidity than A,  who 
has actually given up the $6,000 by the time the tax is due. 
This hypothetical might also be phrased in terms of vertical equity or economic efficiency. If 
A's rent were $15,000, payable 15 days after the close of the year, A and B would pay the same 
tax. But since the $15,000 due in ten years is costing only $6,000, B is in a better position to pay 
tax. Since B's tax liability would not be proportional to his ability to pay tax, verticial equity 
would be defeated. Economic efficiency considerations suggest a similar problem. If rent is 
payable as in the text hypothetical, A and B are making the same discounted payment for their 
premises. B has been induced to rent inferior premises, however, by the landlord's agreement to 
this deferral scheme, since the tax savings reduce B's after tau initial cost to below the fair market 
value of the inferior premises. By encouraging B to enter an otherwise inefficient transaction 
(assuming superior premises were available for the $6,000 rent), the tax system would be distort- 
ing an economically efficient market. 
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Such a shelter scheme has real-life applications in sale-leaseback transac- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~  A buyer-lessor using the cash method2' will not be taxed on the "rent" 
until actually paid, so it is perfectly happy to defer payment of a portion of 
the "rent" (assuming that the seller-lessee is a good credit risk) if the dollar 
amount is increased to make up for the time value of the deferral. A tax- 
exempt buyer-lessor would be equally amenable to such a transaction. The 
long-term lease might provide for low cash payments initially, with increased 
payments at the end of the lease more than a decade later, while providing for 
liability to "accrue" at a flat rate over the life of the lease. The accrual- 
method seller-lessee would then claim a current rent deduction equal to the 
flat rate allocation of the total payments due under the lease, even though 
little or no cash payment is due at the outset.28 (This flat rate allocation is 
26. Besides the accounting issues suggested herein, such sale-leasebacks run the danger of 
recharacterization as financing transactions, or disallowance as lacking economic substance. 
Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305 (1980), aff'd per curiam, 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 103 S. Ct. 211 (1982). Cf. Del Cotto, Sale and Leaseback: A Hollow Sound When 
Tapped?. 37 Tax L. Rev. 1 (1981) (suggesting characterization as sale of future interest). How- 
ever, carefully structured sale-leaseback financing techniques that take advantage of the tax 
benefits of real property ownership were available under the Code before the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Q 201, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as 
amended at I.R.C. Q 168(F)(8) (Supp. VI 1982), authorized "safe harbor" leasing, and probably 
will be available after the repeal of "safe harbors" by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility 
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, Q 209, 96 Stat. 442 (to be codified at I.R.C. Q 168(F)(8)). See 
generally Harmelink & Shurtz, Sale-Leaseback Transactions Involving Real Estate: A Proposal 
for Defined Tax Rules, 55 So. Cal. L. Rev. 833 (1982); Equipment Leasing, Tax Mgmt. (BNA) 
No. 12-5th, at  A-44 (1982). 
27. Nonparallel accounting methods in a sale-leaseback transaction (i.e., an accrual method 
seller-lessee and a cash method buyer-lessor) may raise an intuitive objection, since the accrual 
method taxpayer may get a deduction before the cash method taxpayer reports income. The Code, 
however, cannot bothallow different methods of accounting (as it does in Q 446(c)) and avoid 
having nonparallel accounting methods applied t6  some transactions. Whenever a cash method 
taxpayer does business with an accrual method taxpayer, each will treat the transaction differ- 
ently, to the possible detriment of the Treasury. The Code addresses this problem for transactions 
between related taxpayers, where the deduction is denied to  the accrual method taxpayer unless 
the related taxpayer reports the income within 2% months after the close of the deduction year. 
I.R.C. § 267(a)(2) (1976). The seller and buyer in a sale-leaseback transaction, however, would 
not be considered "related" under $3 267. No case has expanded the statutory rule to require 
parallel accounting in the sale-leaseback context. Compare Q 267 with Alstores Realty Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 46 T.C. 363 (1966), and Steinway & Sons v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 375 (1966) 
(companion cases) (tax court relied on stare decisis to  require the same accounting characteriza- 
tion by both accrual method parties to  a property transfer). Cf. Treas. Reg. Q 1.991-1 (1974) 
(barring nonparallel accounting for controlled group domestic international sales corporations). 
28. Through careful phrasing of the lease terms, the accrual can probably be made to  meet 
the "all events" test. Current accruals based on an aliquot (ratable) allocation of total payments 
due under a lease providing for low initial and high subsequent cash payments have been upheld in 
non sale-leaseback contexts. Grand Ave. Motor Co. v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 423 (D. Minn. 
1954); Rev. Rul. 70-119, 1970-1 C.B. 120. Cf. Consolidated Foods Corp. v. Commissioner, 66 
T.C. 436, 443 (1976) (ratable deductions of payments due are proper, but current credit against 
payment is not ratable under tax benefit rule). In Grand Avenue, the taxpayer, an auto dealer, 
had a lease that provided for a payment reduction during wartime production cutbacks, the 
reduction to be made up in increased rent payments when full production was resumed. The 
taxpayer was allowed to  take an accrued deduction for deferred rent even though it was not to  be 
paid for several years. Compare Grand Avenue (low-high rentals accruable) with Rev. Proc. 75- 
21, 1975-1 C.B. 715, Q 5.01 (Internal Revenue Service (IRS) indicates it will challenge leaseback 
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based on the future rather than present value of the deferred payments.) The 
tax savings of this deferralzQ become part of the tax value of the sale-leaseback 
transaction and are shared by the participants through adjustments in the 
transaction terms. 
Another manipulation of accrual accounting's failure to recognize the 
time value of deferral can be seen in recently proposed schemes to accrue 
nonamortizing loan interest on the basis of the "Rule of 7 8 ~ " ~ ~  The Rule of 
78s applies to the portion of a loan obligation treated as prepaid interest and 
thus not disbursed to the borrower in cash. This "prepaid interest," which has 
not in fact been "prepaid" since no cash has left the borrower's hands, is 
deducted as an expense over the life of the loan. Under the Rule of 78s method 
of allocation, larger amounts are allocated as an expense to earlier periods 
(compared with straight line amortization) and smaller amounts are written 
off later.31 The use of Rule of 78s accounting has been approved in revenue 
low-high rent payments in excess of certain limits, though the IRS does not indicate whether the 
challenge would be to force the lessor to recognize the deferred income currently, or force the 
lessee to defer the deduction). 
Despite these authorities, an argument can be made that lease payments ought not to be 
accruable before payable, as contingent unmatured contractual obligations that do not meet the 
"all events" test. Cf. Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445 (1930) (breach of contract does 
not satisfy "all events" for accrual since payment is contingent on duty to mitigate damages); 
Levin v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1955) (contract obligations not accruable at 
signing; contingent on return performance); Colloids, Inc. v. Manning, 138 F. Supp. 162 (D.N.J. 
1955) (same). The "contingency" of the lease payment due depends, however, on the treatment of 
the lease under state law, on the phrasing of the lease, and possibly on the requirement that lessor 
mitigate damages in the event of a breach by lessee. This is a developing area of property law and 
only a minority of jurisdictions have such a duty to mitigate. See Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 534 (1968). 
The regulations seem to take the opposite approach. They treat a lease as a conveyance rather 
than as a contract subject to constructive conditions. Thus, under Treas. Reg. 8 1.162-ll(a) 
(1958), a purchased leasehold may be amortized ratably over the life of the lease; while the "all 
events" test of Treas. Reg. 5 1.461-l(a) (1957) for all payments to become due may be satisfied 
upon signing the lease, such payments are not immediately deductible because "an asset having a 
useful life which extends substantially beyond the close of the taxable year" is created and must be 
capitalized under Treas. Reg. $1.461-1(a)(2). The ratable deduction under 8 1.162-11(a) will equal 
the yearly payments under a flat rate lease, but will be substantially greater than the yearly 
payments early in the lease under a low-high uneven payment lease. Thus the regulations seem to 
support the accrual that the seller-lessee will be seeking. To be safe under the "all events" test, 
however, the seller-lessee would probably desire a lease clause making liability for the deferred 
portion of the rent absolute as soon as each period ends and providing for payment of all deferred 
rent in case of termination for any reason. 
29. These tax "savings" might be variously determined. One approach is to view the 
difference between the present value of the future net payment and the accrued amount as a 
"phantom" deduction, yielding savings at the marginal rate of the lessee taxpayer. Another 
approach is to view the entire deduction as accelerated and compute the deferral value of the tax 
thus delayed. The former approach might be more accurate since it takes some account of the 
detriment to current taxpaying ability of a future liability. The second approach more closely 
approximates cash accounting treatment. 
30. Cohen, Rule of 78s Interest Accrual: An Outline of Tax Considerations, in 2 Real Estate 
Syndications, P.L.I. Course H.B. No. 213, at  289 (1982); Glickman, Rule of 78s Interest 
Deductions, in id. at 271. 
31. The Rule of 78s is a sum-of-the-months' digits method of amortization. For a one-year 
loan, each month's allocated portion of prepaid interest would be computed by taking a fraction 
whose numerator is the number of months left to  run and whose denominat~r is 78 (the sum of 
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rulings32 in the context of principal amortizing loans where the loan agreement 
provides for a prepayment interest rebate according to the Rule of 78s. In this 
context, the Rule of 78s amortization approximates a loan amortization 
schedule in that the early interest payments are higher, reflecting the higher 
principal balance. 
Even in a flat interest payment nonamortizing loan (where the principal is 
due in a balloon payment at the end), however, the parties may agree to a 
prepayment penalty based on a Rule of 78s allocation of the total interest to 
be earned under the agreement. By allocating a larger portion of the interest to 
early periods even though the principal balance is constant, this Rule of 78s 
allocation does not approximate the real interest rate. But, since this liability 
matures at the close of each period, the "all events" test of accrual accounting 
would be met.33 Such an agreement would attempt to accelerate the deduction 
for interest, yielding a tax deferral benefit.34 If the lender is cash method or 
tax-exempt,35 such a clause can only benefit it by providing for a high prepay- 
ment penalty. Like the rent deferral, this early accrual at full value defeats 
horizontal equity, since the transaction is essentially the same as a loan at flat- 
rate interest payments, for which the borrower would not get such accelerated 
d e d ~ c t i o n s . ~ ~  
Courts have never explicitly recognized this susceptibility of accrual ac- 
counting to abuse by exploiting the time value of a distant obligation. The 
Fifth Circuit approached but did not identify the present value issue in 
Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States.37 There, the court upheld the Com- 
missioner's section 446(b) "clearly reflect income" disallowance of an accrual 
where the time between accrual and payment, according to the court, was 
"too long."38 Mooney concerned the current accrual of a deduction for 
the numbers one through twelve). Thus, the first month's portion would be 12/78, which is 
greater than the 1/12 allocation of straight-line amortization. The next month's allocation is 
11/78, then 10/78, and so on. See generally Glickman, supra note 30. 
32. Rev. Rul. 72-100, 1972-1 C.B. 122; Rev. Rul. 74-395, 1974-2 C.B. 46. 
33. The workings of this Rule of 78s allocation can be illustrated by a loan of $100 at 10% 
interest for two years, with the principal due in full at  the end of the two years. Each year the 
borrower actually pays $10 to the lender. The loan agreement, however, allocates the $20 total 
interest ($10 per year for the two years) according to the Rule of 78s, so that in the first year $14 
of interest would be considered earned (determined by dividing 202, the sum of the remaining 
monthsy digits-24 through 13-by 280, the sum of the digits of the 24 months in the two years, 
and multiplying the resuht by $20, the total interest charge on the loan). This $14 interest allocated 
to  the first year is greater than the $10 interest actually paid and normally allocated. The borrower 
would be legally obligated to pay this $14 at the end of the first year should the loan be prepaid at 
that time. But this penalty would not deter a borrower willing to  forgo the ability to  terminate the 
loan early in return for the tax advantages. The deferral results are more dramatic when the loan 
period is increased. 
34. It might be said that liability is contingent on prepayment and thus not accruable. If this 
is perceived as a problem, the agreement can easily be drafted so that the Rule of 78s liability is 
absolute at the close of each period, the only contingency being as to the time of payment. 
35. Pension funds and life insurance companies, fo r  example, are tax-exempt sources of such 
financing. 
36. The borrower may be said to have given up some taxpaying ability by agreeing to the 
prepayment penalty. 
37. 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1969). 
38. Id. a t  410. 
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"bonds" given to the purchaser of the taxpayer's aircraft. These bonds were 
redeemable for $1,000 when the aircraft was retired. The manufacturer ac- 
crued a deduction for the entire $1,000 in the year of sale. The Fifth Circuit 
found that the "all events" test was satisfied, since the eventual retirement of 
the aircraft was i n e ~ i t a b l e . ~ ~  The court went on to find, however, that the 
remoteness of payment warranted disallowance of the accrual under section 
446(b). In elaborating the reasons why remoteness of payment barred accrual 
as a distortion of income, the court focused on the taxpayer's liquidity40 and 
the diminished likelihood of payment.41 The Mooney court did not articulate 
the factor that the present value of an obligation to be paid in twenty years 
was much diminished. One suspects, however, that a sense of this problem 
contributed to the court's discomfort with the current accrual of such a 
remote payment.42 
The Mooney case, disallowing accrual accounting in a particular situa- 
tion, and the Burck case, similarly disallowing cash accounting, suggest a legal 
approach that would enable the Commissioner to defeat accounting manipula- 
tions. In both cases, the circuit courts relied on the section 446(b) "clearly 
reflect income" test to disallow an accounting method otherwise authorized in 
section 446(c). The courts also relied on the evolving rule that the Commis- 
sioner has discretion to determine whether a particular application of an 
accounting method clearly reflects income. Both courts applied a relaxed 
standard of review in scrutinizing the Commissioner's determinations to disal- 
low the accounting methods at issue. 
Though both cases applied a relaxed standard of review to the Commis- 
sioner's determination, no case under section 446(b) has interpreted the nature 
of the Commissioner's discretion or the content of the "clearly reflect in- 
39. Id. at  406. 
40. Id. a t  409-10. 
41. Id. at  410. Cf. Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1955) (unlikelihood of payment 
does not bar accrual); Zimmerman Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1942) 
(same). The Mooney court called the rule in these cases "dubious . . . in light of Sclrbrde and 
AAA." 420 F.2d at 410 11-38. See generally discussion of Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 
(1963) and American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961), infra text accompa- 
nying notes 133-43. 
42. See the Mooney court's langauge in discussing the liquidity aspect: 
In this case . . . the related expenditure is so distant from the time the money is received 
as to completely attenuate any relationship between the two. For all practical purposes 
the revenue taxpayer received from the sale of the planes is his to use as he pleases. 
Rather than being set up as a reserve . . . it is far more probable that the money will be 
used as capital to  expand the business. 
420 F.2d a t  409-10. See A. Gunn, Federal Income Taxation Cases and Other Materials 662 (1981) 
(noting the present value aspect of Mooney). 
There may also be an economic efficiency aspect to the Mooney case. The "Mooney bonds" 
were a real reduction in the price of the aircraft, and if the amount of the reduction was based in 
part on the manufacturer's expected tax benefit from immediate deduction, the price reduction 
may have been uneconomical. If Mooney invested the $500 tax reduction (assuming a 50% 
bracket), the fund thus created would more than cover the cost of redeeming the bonds over 
normal airplane life. Mooney thus gets a "free" price advantage, distorting the market for 
aircraft. 
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come" test in such a way that disallowance of manipulative accrual account- 
ing could be predicted with confidence. A court might limit Burck to cash 
accounting abuse.43 The Mooney holding that time for payment was "too 
long" rested on the shaky grounds of taxpayer liquidity and diminished 
likelihood of eventual payment. Extension of these cases to the disallowance 
of the accrual manipulations discussed earlier depends on the nature of the 
Commissioner's discretion under section 446(b), the content of the "clearly 
reflect income" test, and the relationship between the two. If the defeat of tax 
equity inherent in these accrual schemes can be the basis for the Commission- 
er's exercise of discretion to disallow an accounting method, the Commis- 
sioner may successfully thwart them. 
The decision of whether the Commissioner has discretion to disallow 
accounting methods that do not clearly reflect income is essentially a decision 
as to whether the Commissioner or the courts should have determinative 
power to interpret section 446. A determination that an accounting method 
does not "clearly reflect income" would seem to be a decision of a mixed 
question of law and fact.44 Evidentiary and historical facts usually are not 
disputed in this context;45 determination of the question usually depends on 
the legal construction of the statutory language as applied to particular facts.46 
While it is often said in the context of judicial review of such "mixed 
questions" that courts decide the law and agencies decide the facts, it is 
seldom easy to separate the For this reason, commentators have dis- 
counted the importance of the law-fact distinction and the bar against agency 
discretion to make "legal"  determination^.^^ Professor Davis has suggested 
that the judicial parsing of the law-fact distinction is actually a determination 
of whether the matter is appropriate for agency d i sc re t i~n .~~  Professor Jaffe 
43. See discussion of judicial attitudes towards cash accounting infra note 163. 
44. Cf. Madison Gas & Elec. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521, 555 (1979) ("primarily a 
question of fact"), aff'd, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980); Peninsula Steel Prods. & Equip. v. 
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1029, 1045 (1982) (same). See generally K. Davis, Administrative Law 
Text 545-56 (3d ed. 1972). 
45. Cf. American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 691 (1961) (rejecting 
attempt to distinguish on basis of different proof); RCA Corp. v. United States, 664 F.2d 881,882 
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2958 (1982) (5 446(b) case "tried largely on a stipulated 
record, and the facts are substantially undisputed"). 
46. Cf. L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 569-75 (1965) (application of 
construction of statutory language to fact; argument for extension of agency discretion to legal 
interpretation of statutory language). 
47. See K. Davis, supra note 44, at 545-56. 
48. See generally Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1,4, 
25-31 (1983) (rejecting distinction between determination of mixed question and agency rule- 
making). 
49. See K. Davis supra note 44, at 545-56. 
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has urged that agency discretion be extended to legal determinations not 
contrary to the "clear purpose" of the statute.50 It follows that the relevant 
characterization of the section 446(b) "clearly reflect income" determination 
is not whether it is "law" or "fact," but rather whether the discretion to 
apply the "clearly reflect income" test, which has a legal dimension, has been 
granted to the Commissioner. The central question, then, is whether Congress 
intended in section 446 to grant this discretion to the Commissioner. 
A. Source of Discretion: Thor Power Tool 
The Supreme Court's reaffirmation, in Thor Power Tool Co. v. Cornrnis- 
~ i o n e r , ~ ~  that the Commissioner has discretion to determine whether or not an 
accounting method employed by a taxpayer clearly reflects income is appar- 
ently a little-noted recent development in the law.52 Such discretion is not 
compelled by a literal reading of section 446(b), which provides, "[ilf no 
method of accounting has been regularly used by the taxpayer, or if the 
method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation of taxable 
income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary, 
does clearly reflect income."53 Though the Commissioner (as delegate of the 
S e ~ r e t a r y ) ~ ~  is assigned the task of choosing the accounting method to be used 
if the taxpayer's method does not clearly reflect income, the wording of the 
statute does not require that the Commissioner make the initial determination 
of whether or not a particular accounting method clearly reflects income. The 
statutory language could be read as leaving that determination to the courts. 
50. See L. Jaffe, supra note 46 at 569-75. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 48, at 25-31 (delegation 
of lawmaking discretion constitutionally permissible). 
51. 439 U.S. 522 (1979). 
52. The Thor case is discussed in Bush, Flannery, & Dasburg, IRS's Tough New Rules Under 
Thor Power: How They Work; What They Mean, How to Cope, 52 J. Tax'n 194 (1980); Dasburg, 
Porche, & Flannery, Inventory Valuation After Thor Power Tool: Analyzing the S. Ct. Decision 
and its Impact, 50 J. Tax'n 200 (1979); Young, Supreme Court Report, 65 A.B.A. J. 448, 462 
(1979); Mihalov, Inventory Write-Downs and Thor Power Tool, 57 Taxes 384 (1979); Sutherland, 
Tax Treatment of Inventory Write-Downs after Thor Power Tool, 29 Tul. Tax Inst. 9 (1980); 
Note, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles as a Reflection of Income: Thor Power Tool 
Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 9 Cap. U.L. Rev. 775 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 
Note, Generally Accepted Accounting]; Note, Thor Power Tool Co. v. C.I.R. Further Erodes 
C.P.A.'s Defense of Observing Professional Standards, 19 Am. Bus. L.J. 87 (1981). Of these 
treatments, only Dasburg, Porche, & Flannery, supra, at 202-03, and Note, Generally Accepted 
Accounting, supra, a t  782-84, consider the scope of the Commissioner's discretion. Neither treats 
the subject in depth. 
Several circuit court cases dealing with § 446(b) determinations do not even cite Thor. E.g., 
Ferrill v. Commissioner, 684 F.2d 261, 263 (3rd Cir. 1982); NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 
F.2d 942, 953 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated on reh'g, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) (no discussion of 
discretion issue). The NCNB court seems to have read Thor, since their reasoning that tax 
accounting and financial accounting have different goals closely tracks that of the Thor Court. 
Compare NCNB, 651 F.2d at 955, with Thor, 439 U.S. at 542. 
53. I.R.C. 8 446(b) (1976) (emphasis added). 
54. The Code, id. 5 7701(a)(ll)(B) (1976), defines "Secretary" as "Secretary of the Treasury 
or  his delegate." 
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The legislative histories of section 446(b)55 and its  predecessor^^^ are at 
best ambiguous on the question of who shall make the "clearly reflect in- 
come" determinat i~n.~~ Treasury regulations promulgated under the prede- 
cessors to section 446(b) were essentially neutral on the question.58 When 
55. I.R.C. 5 446(b) is discussed in H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A157-58, 
reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4017, 4296-97 [hereinafter cited as House 
Report]; S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 299-300, reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Ad. News 4621,4939-40 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report]. The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. 
L. No. 94-455, 5 1906(b)(13)(A), 90 Stat. 1520, 1834, (codified at I.R.C. 5 446(b) (Supp. I 1977)) 
amended 5 446(b) by substituting "Secretary" for "Secretary or his delegate." At the same time, 
the Tax Reform Act amended I.R.C. 5 7701 to define "Secretary" as "Secretary of the Treasury 
or his delegate." Id. at  5 1906(a)(57)(A) (codified at I.R.C. 5 7701(a)(ll)(b) (Supp. I 1977)). 
56. The requirement that a tax accounting method "clearly reflect income" first appeared in 
the Revenue Act of 1916: 
[A] corporation, joint stock cornpar& or association, or insurance company, keeping 
accounts upon any basis other than that of actual receipts and disbursements, unless 
such other basis does not clearly reflect its income, may, subject to regulations made by 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue . . . make its return upon the basis upon which 
its accounts are kept . . . . 
Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 5 13(d), 39 Stat. 756,771 (repealed 1918) (emphasis added). Cf. id. 
5 8(g) (similar language applied to individuals). Section 13(d) is considered in H.R. Rep. No. 922, 
64th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1916); H.R. Rep. No. 1200, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1916); J.S. 
Seidman, Seidman's Legislative History of Federal Income Tax Laws 1938-1861, at  974 (1938) 
(statement of R.R. Reed at Senate Finance Committee Hearing) [hereinafter cited as J.S. Seidman 
11. 
The Revenue Act of 1918's analogous section read: 
The net income shall be computed upon the basis of the taxpayer's annual account- 
ing period . . . in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed in 
keeping the books of such taxpayer; but if no such method of accounting has been so 
employed, or if the method employed does not clearly reflect the income, the computa- 
tion shall be made upon such basis and in such manner as in the opinion of the 
Commissioner does clearly reflect the income. 
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 5 212(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1064-65 (repealed 1921) (emphasis added). 
This section is considered in H.R. Rep. No. 1037, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 47 (1917) (amendment a 
"clerical change"); Hearings Before the Senate Finance Comm. 23 (1917) (statement of A.E. 
Holcomb). See J.S. Seidman I, supra, at  903. 
The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 essentially adopted the 1918 Act 5 212@) language in 
haec verba without any comment in committee reports. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 2, 5 
41, 53 Stat. 1, 24 (repealed 1954). See 1 J.S. Seidman, Seidman's Legislative History of Federal 
Income Tax and Excess Profits Tax Laws 1953-1939, at  1460 (1954). 
57. While the committee reports on the various "clearly reflect income" provisions repeat 
the statutory langauge, none considers who shall make the determination. See the committee 
reports cited supra notes 55 & 56. 
The original 1916 bill, as introduced, H.R. 16763,64th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in S. Doc. 
531, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1916), read "unless the Commissioner of Internal Revenuefinds 
that such other basis does not clearly reflect his income." Id. (emphasis added). The italicized 
language was dropped by the Senate in the final bill. The only inference that can be drawn from 
this change works against the existence of Commissioner discretion to determine whether income 
is clearly reflected. The conference committee report, however, referred to the change as "cleri- 
cal" and did not discuss it. H.R. Rep. No. 1200,64th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1916). See J.S. Seidman 
I, supra note 56, at  974. 
58. Treas. Regulations No. 33 (1913), promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 
39 Stat. 756 (repealed 1918). does not refer to the "clearly reflect income" standard. Treas. 
Regulations No. 45 (1919), promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057 
(1919) (repealed 1921), provides in article 22 that: 
The time as of which any item of gross income or any deduction is to be accounted for 
must be determined in the light of the fundamental rule that the computation shall be 
made in such a manner as clearly reflects the taxpayer's income. If the m'ethod of 
accounting regularly employed by him in keeping his books clearly reflects his income, it 
is to be followed . . . . 
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regulations were first issued under section 446(b) of the 1954 Code,50 despite 
the adoption in haec verba of the "clearly reflect income" formulation of the 
1939 Code,Oo Regulations section 1.446-1(a)(2) asserted that "no method of 
accounting is acceptable unless, in the opinion of the Commissioner, it clearly 
reflects income."01 The tension between this regulation and the statutory 
language led one early commentator, who maintained that the burden of 
showing that income was not clearly reflected was on the Commiss i~ner ,~~ to 
refer to section 1.446-1(a)(2) as one of the "conflicting provisions of the 
present regulations, which presumably would be held to be invalid."03 
In Thor Power Tool Co. v. Cornrnis~ioner,~~ the Supreme Court stated: 
It is obvious that on their face, §§ 446 and 471, with their 
accompanying Regulations, vest the Commissioner with wide discre- 
tion in determining whether a particular method of inventory ac- 
counting should be disallowed as not clearly reflective of income. 
This Court's cases confirm the breadth of this discretion.OS 
Thor involved the inventory accounting method used by a tool manufacturer. 
The manufacturer intentionally produced more replacement parts for discon- 
tinued models than its estimate of demand, in order to avoid retooling costs 
should demand exceed the estimate.Oe The manufacturer then wrote down this 
excess inventory to scrap value,07 essentially taking a current deduction for the 
manufacturing cost of items remaining in its inventory. This practice was in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP),OO but was 
contrary to the inventory accounting methods prescribed by the  regulation^.^^ 
Adopting a standard of review that would require the taxpayer to demon- 
strate70 "clearly unlawful"71 or "plainly arbitrary"72 abuse of discretion, the 
Treas. Regulations No. 45, supra, at  18. In article 23, these regulations provided that "[alpproved 
standard methods of accounting will ordinarily be regarded as clearly reflecting income. A 
method of accounting willnot, however, be regarded as clearly reflecting income unless all items 
of gross income and all deductions are treated with reasonable consistency." Id. While these 
regulations thus form a test for "clearly reflect income," they do not claim Commissioner 
discretion to apply the test. This 1920 formulation was adopted for the regulations right up 
through the 1939 code. See Treas. Regulations No. 103, $0 1941-1 to -2 (1940). 
59. Treas. Reg. $ 1.446-1, T.D. 6282, 1958-1 C.B. 215, 217 (1957). 
60. Section 41 of the 1939 Code read: "if no such method of accounting has been so 
employed, or if the method employed does not clearly reflect the income, the computation shall be 
made in accordance with such method as in the opinion of the Commissioner does clearly reflect 
the income." Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 2, $ 41, 53 Stat. 1, 24 (repealed 1954). 
61. Treas. Reg. $ 1.446-1 (1957). 
62. Graves, Limitations on Commissioner's Power to Require Accounting Changes, 19 
N.Y.U. Tax Inst. 1209, 1212 (1961) ("Unless the Commissioner can demonstrate that the method 
he seeks to  change does not reflect income he has substantially no basis on which to proceed."). 
63. Id. a t  1219. 
64. 439 U.S. 522 (1979). 
65. Id. at  532. 
66. Id. a t  525-26. 
67. Id. at  527. 
68. Id. a t  530. 
69. Id. at  533-35; Treas. Reg. $5 1.471-2, -4 (1958). 
70. 439 U.S. at  532, 538. 
71. Id. at  532 (quoting Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 449 (1930)). 
72. Id. a t  533 (quoting Lucas v. Structural Steel Co., 281 U.S. 264, 271 (1930)). 
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Court found disallowance of the taxpayer's method to be a proper exercise of 
the Commissioner's d i~cre t ion .~~ 
Since section 471 of the Code explicitly grants discretion to the Commis- 
sioner in prescribing inventory accounting methods that clearly reflect in- 
come,74 the Court's remarks concerning discretion under section 446 may be 
dictum. The Court considered section 446 in response to the taxpayer's asser- 
tion that under the section 446  regulation^,^^ an accounting method in accord- 
ance with GAAP is presumptively valid as a clear reflection of income.76 By 
rejecting this assertion, the Court might only be holding that the presumption 
of validity under section 446 is limited by specific regulations under the 
discretion explicitly granted by section 471.77 Thor can, however, be read 
more broadly, as suggested by the Court's "obvious . . . on their face" 
language, to hold that the presumptive validity of GAAP, implicit in section 
446 of the statute,7s is limited by the Commissioner's discretion to reject an 
accounting method, which discretion the Court also found in section 446 of 
the statute.70 
73. Id. at  537-38. 
74. 5 471 provides: 
Whenever in the opinion of the Secretary the use of inventories is necessary in order 
clearly to determine the income of any taxpayer, inventories shall be taken by such 
taxpayer on such basis as the Secretary may prescribe as conforming as nearly as may be 
to the best accounting practice in the trade or business and as most clearly reflecting the 
income. 
I.R.C. 5 471 (1976). 
75. 5 1.446-1(a)(2) provides that "[a] method of accounting which reflects the consistent 
application of generally accepted accounting principles in a particular trade or business in 
accordance with accepted conditions or practices in that trade or business will ordinarily be 
regarded as clearly reflecting income . . . ." Treas. Reg. 5 1.446-1(a)(2) (1957). 
76. Thor, 439 U.S. at  538. 
77. See the Court's language in Thor: 
If the Code and Regulations did embody the presumption [in favor of GAAP] that 
petitioner postulates, it would be of little use to the taxpayer in this case. As we have 
noted, Thor's write-down of "excess" inventory was inconsistent with the Regulations; 
any general presumption obviously must yield in the face of such particular inconsist- 
ency. 
~ d .  at 540. 
78. 5 446(a) of the 1954 Code states the general rule that "[tlaxable income shall be 
computed under the method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes 
his income in keeping his books." I.R.C. 5 446(a) (1976). The regular method of a business 
taxpayer will usually be according to  GAAP. The House Committee on Ways and Means Report 
on the 1954 Code states: "A method of accounting which reflects the consistent application of 
generally accepted accounting principles in a trade or business will ordinarily be considered as 
clearly reflecting income." House Report, supra note 55, at  A157-58, reprinted in 1954 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Ad. News 4017, 4296. The Senate Finance Committee report uses the same 
language. Senate Report, supra note 55, a t  299-300, reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. 
News 4621, 4939. 
79. The 5 446(b) "clearly reflect income" test is labeled as an exception to the 5 446(a) 
authorization of book accounting methods. I.R.C. 5 446(b) (1976). Cf. Thor, 439 U.S. at  532 
(broad discretion on face of 5 446@)); Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 449 (1930) 
("clearly reflect income" expressly limits book method); A. Marrs, Revenue Bill of 1954, at  21 
(1953) ("recurring attempts" of accounting profession to  make GAAP presumptively valid 
limited by "clearly reflect income" test). 
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The cases cited by the Thor Courts0 in support of broad Commissioner 
discretion under section 446 all suffer from a similar ambiguity. While each 
case cited contains explicit language in support of Commissioner discretion 
under section 446 to determine whether income is clearly refle~ted,~' each case 
may also be distinguished as involving a different question. The cases might be 
seen as decisions on the proper application of the accounting method used 
rather than on the propriety of using the accounting method in particular 
circ~mstances.~~ 
Thus, the discussion of Commissioner discretion in these cases may not 
have been required by the facts before the courts. But by claiming to adopt the 
relaxed abuse of discretion standard of review, these cases ought to be read as 
support, though hardly "obvious," for the proposition that Commissioner 
discretion does exist under section 446. If these casese3 did not, in fact, 
80. The Thor Court cites United States v. Catto, 384 U.S. 102 (1966); Schlude v. Commis- 
sioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963); American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961); 
Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (1959); Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 
(1957); Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934); Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445 
(1930). Thor, 439 U.S. a t  532. 
81. United States v. Catto, 384 U.S. 102, 114 (1966) ("Congress has granted the Commis- 
sioner broad discretion in shepherding the accounting methods used by taxpayers . , . ."); 
Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128, 133 (1963) ("the Commissioner, exercising his discretion 
under 8 41, 1939 Code, and 8 446(b), 1954 Code" (footnotes omitted)); American Automobile 
Ass'n v. United States (AAA), 367 U.S. 687,697-98 (1961) ("[flinding only that . . . the exercise 
of the Commissioner's discretion in rejecting the . . . accounting system was not unsound"); 
Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 467 (1959) ("The Commissioner has broad powers in 
determining whether accounting methods used by a taxpayer clearly reflect income . . . ."); 
Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner (Michigan), 353 U.S. 180, 189-90 (1957) ("Sec- 
tion 41 vests the Commissioner with discretion to determine whether the petitioner's method of 
accounting clearly reflects income. We cannot say, in the circumstances here, that the discretion- 
ary action of the Commissioner. . . exceeded permissible limits."); Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 
193,203 (1934) ("[ilf in the opinion of the Commissioner it does not clearly reflect the income"); 
Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 449 (1930) ("[Tlhe direction that net income be 
computed according to the method of accounting regularly employed by the taxpayer is expressly 
limited to  cases where the Commissioner believes that the accounts clearly reflect the net income. 
Much latitude for discretion is thus given . . . ."). 
82. It is possible to distinguish an error in the application of an acceptable accounting 
method from the use of an accounting method which does not clearly reflect income in particular 
circumstances. Cf. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 650 F.2d 250,256 (Ct. C1. 1981) ("We are not 
dealing with issues of abuse of discretion, but, rather, the interpretation of the all events test."); 
0 Liquidating Corp. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. 154 (1960) (correction of error not change in 
method); Graves, supra note 62, at  1210 (necessary to distinguish between correction and change). 
With this distinction in mind, American Code Co. and Brown, both of which concerned attempts 
to  accrue deductions before the "all events" test for accrual deductions was satisfied (Treas. Reg. 
8 1.461-1(a)(2) (1957)) by setting up accounting reserves, can be seen as erroneous applications of 
an acceptable accounting method. AAA, Michinan, Hansen. and Schlude can similarly be viewed 
as  decisions concerninithe proper time for recognizing income under an accrual-accounting 
system, rather than as a Commissioner disallowance of the unchallenged rules of an accounting 
method. 
Catto, the remaining cited case, does not require Commissioner discretion to disallow 
accounting methods under 5 446(b). In Cafto, a rancher sought to avoid the inclusion of breeding 
stock in inventory as required by Treas. Reg. 8 1.471-6(f). 384 U.S. at 108-09 (1966). Since 8 471 
of the 1954 Code explicitly grants discretion to the Commissioner, supra note 74, the Catlo 
decision under that provision does not require an "abuse of discretion" standard under 8 446(b). 
83. With the exception of Catto. See discussion of cases supra note 82. 
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consider the issue to be the acceptability of a particular accounting method, 
there would be no need to enunciate the "clearly reflect income" test, nor 
would a relaxed standard of review be applicable. The court would simply 
consider the principles for applying the accounting method in question to 
determine whether it was erroneously applied.84 
The broader reading of the Thor holding has been adopted by the First, 
Second, and Eighth Circuits in evaluating challenges to accounting methods 
under section 446(b).85 The Second Circuit, in RCA Corp. v. United States,8e 
cited Thor for the proposition that "[ilt is well established that the Commis- 
sioner enjoys 'broad discretion' to determine whether, 'in [his] opinion,' a 
taxpayer's accounting methods clearly reflect income."87 Similarly, the Eighth 
Circuit, in Record Wide Distributors, Inc. v. Comrni~sioner,~~ cited Thor in 
support of the Commissioner's "broad discretion to evaluate and modify a 
taxpayer's accounting method in order to insure the clear reflection of in- 
come."8g In Bay State Gas Co. v. Commissi~ner ,~~ the First Circuit also cited 
Thor in support of both the Commissioner's "broad discretion" to make the 
section 446(b) determination and a relaxed standard of review of such a 
determinati~n.~' These opinions neither attempted to limit the Thor Court's 
language as dictum, nor distinguished the earlier cases as involving errors of 
accounting application. These cases, combined with the Thor Court's conclu- 
sory citation of the prior Supreme Court cases, would seem to settle the 
question of the existence of Commissioner discretion under section 446(b). 
Moreover, determining the acceptability of a method of tax accounting is 
an appropriate matter for agency discretion. If one accepts that "[it] is not the 
province of the court to weigh and determine the relative merits of systems of 
acco~nt ing , "~~  and that "no uniform method of accounting can be prescribed 
84. Cf. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 650 F.2d 250,256 (Ct. C1. 1981) ("We are not dealing 
with issues of abuse of discretion, but, rather, the interpretation of the all events test."). 
However, the Commissioner's power to disallow an accounting method as applied to only one 
item while requiring retention of the overall accounting method, upheld in United States v. 
American Can Co., 280 U.S. 412 (1930); Anderson v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 386, 388-89 (5th 
Cir. 1979); Sandor v. Commissioner, 536 F.2d 874, 875 (9th Cir. 1976), vitiates this distinction 
between erroneous application and improper method. The American Code and Brown decisions 
Cap as easily be viewed as concerning questioned accounting methods (setting up reserves) as they 
can be viewed as concerning the erroneous applications of accrual accounting (timing of deduc- 
tions for underlying expenses). 
85. Cf. Frysinger v. Commissioner, 645 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1981) (discretion acknowledged 
but limited by specific regulations). 
86. 664 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 19811, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2958 (1982). 
. . 
87. Id. at 886. 
88. 682 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3552 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1983) (No. 
82-868). 
89. Id. at 206. 
90. 689 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982). 
91. Id. at 4. The court went on to reject the Commissioner's challenge, finding his distinction 
requiring different accounting treatment of similar events "not rational." Id. at 7. 
92. A statement oft repeated by the Supreme Court. United States v. Catto, 384 U.S. 102, 
114 (1966); Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446,467 (1959); Automobile Club of Michigan v. 
Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 189-90 (1957); Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193, 204-05 (1934); 
Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 449 (1930). 
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for all taxpayers,"03 it follows that either the Commissioner's or the taxpay- 
er's choice of method must be given presumptive effect.94 Given the relative 
self-interest of Commissioner and taxpayer, and the numerous extra-judicial 
considerationso5 that go into "the equitable collection of revenue,"OO Commis- 
sioner discretion is preferable to taxpayer discretion.07 
B. Nature and Limits of Section 446(b) Discretion 
Simply to call the section 446(b) determination a matter of Commissioner 
discretion is meaningless without some notion of the standard of judicial 
review that will be applied to exercises of that discretion. 
Given that some discretion has been granted, judicial review of a Com- 
missioner determination is limited to an abuse of discretion standard of review 
consisting of two inquiries.08 First, as a threshold matter, a court must decide 
whether the determination was within the grant of discretion; that is, whether 
the action taken was both appropriate for agency discretion and within the 
range of discretionary actions granted.O0 If not, the determination does not 
93. Treas. Reg. 5 1.446-1(a)(2) (1957). 
94. Compare Van Pickerill &Sons, Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 1971), 
where the Seventh Circuit, while using language to the effect that courts should not weigh the 
relative merits of accounting methods, sided with taxpayer's choice of alternative accounting 
methods. See also Peninsula Steel Prods. &Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1029, 1044-45 
(1982). On the acceptability of taxpayer choice of accounting method, cf. Thor, 439 U.S. at 544 
(taxpayer discretion would allow taxpayer to determine tax it wished to pay). 
95. Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) (weighing competing regulatory policies argues for nonreviewable discretion); Local 2855, 
Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States, 602 F.2d 574, 579 (3d Cir. 1979) (broad 
discretion suggests that nonjudicial factors go into decision); K. Davis, supra note 44, at 548-49. 
96. Thor, 439 U.S. at  542. The statutory IRS purpose of "protect[ing] the public fisc," id., 
there enunciated can be seen to involve considerations that go beyond judicial interpretation of 
the "clearly reflects income" language. 
97. "Clearly reflect income" determinations are explicitly considered appropriate for the 
Commissioner by the statute in contexts other than the evaluation of taxpayer's choice of method; 
section 446(b) explicitly gives the Commissioner discretion to choose an accounting method where 
the taxpayer had none, and 8 471 explicitly gives the Commissioner discretion to choose inventory 
accounting methods which "most clearly reflect income." I.R.C. 5 471 (1976). Of course, this 
argument might cut both ways; it might be said that the Congress knew how to grant discretion 
when it meant to. 
98. It should be noted that, while the exercise of discretion is subject to a relaxed standard of 
review, the initial determination as to  whether discretion exists is a matter over which the court 
has full scope of review. 
99. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,415-16 (1971); L. Jaffe, 
supra note 46, at  359; Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 Yale L.J. 965, 973 
(1969). Overfon Park interpreted 5 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 5 
706 (1976), which provides for review of agency action for arbitrariness. Id. 8 706(2)(A). Though 
no cases specifically apply the APA to 5 446(b) determinations, by its terms the APA would 
encompass tax litigation. Section 10(a) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 5 701(a) (1976) provides that "[tlhis 
chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that-(1) statutes 
preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law," while 5 
lo@) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 8 703(1976), provides that "[tlhe form of proceeding for judicial 
review is the special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified 
by statute." Thus, the procedures for judicial review outlined in I.R.C. 8 6213 (1976) (petition to 
Tax Court to  redetermine assessment) and I.R.C. 5 7422 (1976) (action for refund of taxes paid) is 
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enjoy the relaxed standard of review. The second inquiry is one of whether or 
not discretion has been abused. The scope of this inquiry is somewhat flexi- 
ble.loO In practice, courts reviewing "discretionary" applications of law to 
fact for abuse either apply a "rational basis" test or substitute their own 
judgment for that of the agency.lo1 The latter approach is highly question- 
able.loz 
The "rational basis" test of administrative discretion has two prongs. 
First, a court must decide what factors are legally relevant within the grant of 
discretion.lo3 Second, a court must inquire whether the determination was 
reasonably based on these factors.lo4 
Decisions under section 446(b) since Thor reflect a confusion about 
whether to apply a rational basis test or to substitute the judgment of the court 
for that of the Commissioner. In RCA Corp. v. United States,lo5 for instance, 
the Second Circuit declined to find an abuse of discretion, saying: 
the "statutory review proceeding" referred to by the APA. See Pierson v. United States, 428 F. 
Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1977), where the district court considered the applicability of the APA to a 
discretionary decision under I.R.C. 5 7805(b) (1976) to make a ruling retroactive: "On its face, 
the APA would arguably appear to apply. . . . Nevertheless . . . the Court and the parties have 
been unable to find any decision holding that the APA does regulate the scope of review . . . ." 
428 F. Supp. at  389 (footnote omitted). Query whether I.R.C. 5 6214(a) (1976), authorizing the 
Tax Court to "redetermine the correct amount," implies a stricter standard of review in Tax 
Court proceedings. It seems unlikely, however, that Congress intended Commissioner discretion 
to have greater weight in district courts than in tax courts. Cf. Bernuth v. Commissioner, 470 F.2d 
710, 714 (2d Cir. 1972) ("black letter law" that Commissioner determinations in general enjoy 
presumption of correctness in Tax Court proceedings). 
100. It has been suggested that once a matter is "committed by law" to agency discretion, it 
is immune from judicial review. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 
410 (1971); K. Davis, supra note 44, 3 28.05, at  515. Under Professor Davis's approach, a 
determination that a matter was "committed to agency discretion by law" would be equivalent to  
a determination that it was not judicially reviewable. However, some agency actions not found to 
be "committed by law" to agency discretion would be reviewable on an "abuse of discretion 
standard." See APA 5 IO(a),(e), 5 U.S.C. $8 701, 706 (1976). Such immunity from review is said 
to exist only where the statute provides "no law to apply." Overton Park, 401 U.S. at  410 
(quoting S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)). Thus the distinction is primarily 
semantic. Actions "committed to agency discretion" are unreviewable but some actions not so 
committed are reviewable under an "abuse of discretion" standard. Section 446(b) does not 
present such a case of unreviewable discretion. 
101. Compare Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941), where the Court stated that a lack of 
"dispute as to the evidentiary facts . . . does not permit a court to substitute its judgment for that 
of the Director." id. at  412, and that the reversal of the agency determination would not be had 
unless the factors considered by the agency are "so unrelated to the tasks entrusted by Congress to  
the Commission as in effect to  deny a sensible exercise of judgment," id. at  413, with Davis 
Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1944), where the Court substituted its own definition for 
an administrative determination. See generally K. Davis, supra note 44, 3 30.04-.07. Compare 
APA 5 10(e), 5 U.S.C. 5 706(2)(A) (1976), which provides for review of administrative action for 
being "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 
102. The Supreme Court rejected substitution of judgment in Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971): "The court is not empowered to  substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency." 
103. Id.; L. Jaffe, supra note 46, at  181. But see discussion of agency power to  define 
relevant factors, infra note 118. 
104. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); L. Jaffe, 
supra note 46, at  586-87. 
105. 664 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2958 (1982). 
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The task of a reviewing court, therefore, is not to determine whether 
in its own opinion RCA7s method of accounting for prepaid service 
contract income "clearly reflect[ed] income," but to determine 
whether there is an adequate basis in law for the Commissioner's 
conclusion that it did not.lo6 
On the other hand, the Tax Court, in Peninsula Steel Products & Equipment 
Co. v. Commi~s ioner ,~~~  while acknowledging the Commissioner's "broad 
discretion in determining whether an accounting method clearly reflects in- 
come,"lo8 reversed such a determination, stating, "We believe that the 
method used by [the taxpayers] clearly reflected their . . . income . . . and, 
accordingly, [the Commissioner] is without authority to change it."Ioo The 
Tax Court approach, by substituting its own judgment for that of the Com- 
missioner, seems to leave little room for the Commissioner to exercise his 
"discretion." The Second Circuit's "adequate basis in law" test in RCA 
seems to approximate the more limited review of the "rational basis" test. 
This rational or reasonable basis test is the better rule in a case where the 
matter has been found appropriate for agency discretion. To say that an 
agency has discretion in a matter but that an exercise of such discretion is 
subject to the substitution of a court's opinion is self-contradi~tory.~~~ If a 
grant of discretion is to have meaning, it must impose some limit on the scope 
of judicial review. 
Commissioner discretion under section 446(b) is not thus made limitless. 
A taxpayer may show an abuse of discretion under the rational basis test, by 
showing that the motivating factor for the determination is irrelevant1'' or 
n~nexistent,"~ or that a relevant factor was grossly exaggerated in the deci- 
 ion,"^ or that the determination is inconsistent with prior  determination^."^ 
106. Id. at 886 (brackets in the original). 
107. 78 T.C. 1029 (1982). 
108. Id. at 1044. 
109. Id. a t  1052 (footnote omitted). 
110. Cf. K. Davis, supra note 44, 5 30.05 (substitution of judgment not associated with 
limited scope of review). 
111. Cf. Wong Wing Hang v. INS, 360 F.2d 715,719 (2d. Cir. 1966) (use of an impermissi- 
ble basis of decision is abuse of discretion); Koebig & Koebig, Inc. v. Commissioner, 1964 T.C.M. 
(P-H) 1 64,032, at 64,200 (1964) ("unable to find a sound reason for [Commissioner's] conten- 
tions" and Commissioner "not empowered to reconstruct . . . income . . . to secure more 
favorable tax results"; thus greater revenue by itself apparently is an irrelevant consideration). 
112. Cf. IBM Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914, 920 (Ct. CI. 1965) (discretion to make 
ruling prospective only, under I.R.C. 5 7805; " '[tlhe Commissioner cannot tax one and not tax 
another without some rational basis for the difference,' " quoting United States V. Kaiser, 363 
U.S. 299, 308 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
113. L. Jaffe, supra note 46, at 586-87. In Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. United States, 
476 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1973), the Fourth Circuit found no rational basis for an exercise of 
discretion under I.R.C. 5 7805 (1976) to make a favorable ruling effective for prior years for 
which returns were filed consistent with the ruling, but not allowing amended returns to take 
advantage of the ruling. While the court did not consider this point, the prospective effect might 
have been based on administrative convenience-to avoid the burden of processing amended 
returns. Such a basis might have been seen as insufficient, of itself, to support the action. 
114. Bay State Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982). Bay Sfateconcerned the 
Commissioner's determination to require a utility to accrue as income gas delivered after the last 
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The Commissioner's discretion is also limited by specific statutory115 or regu- 
latorylle authorizations of the accounting method challenged. A proper appli- 
cation of the rational basis test would not, however, allow a taxpayer to 
prevail merely by proving that his income was "clearly reflected." 
Nevertheless, implicit in judicial review of any discretionary administra- 
tive determination is some judicial inquiry into the content of the language 
and the legislative purpose of the statute considered. At the very least, the 
reviewing court must decide that the determination is not contrary to the 
"clear purpose" of the statute.l17 In the section 446 context, a court is likely 
to define the legally relevant factors that the Commissioner must consider in 
exercising discretion.l18 To do so, the reviewing court must first impart some 
meaning to the "clearly reflect income" language. The court may then de- 
velop the legally relevant discretionary factors by considering the statutory 
language in the context of the purpose of the Internal Revenue Code, under 
meter reading for the year for one group of consumers, but not for another. The court found an 
abuse of discretion, but apparently did not challenge the Commissioner's power to require such 
accruals for all customers. 
115. Cf. Peninsula Steel Prods. & Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1029, 1057-1059 
(1982) (3 472 authorization of LIFO inventories limits Commissioner discretion to disallow use of 
LIFO). As a matter of statutory construction a particular authorization of a deduction would 
supplant the general grant of discretion to determine whether income is clearly reflected in 8 
446(b). Consider the example of the Accelerated Cost Recovery System, I.R.C. 5 168 (Supp. VI 
1982); the fast capital write-offs there allowed would not be in accordance even with the conserva- 
tive principles of GAAP, but the Commissioner presumably cannot deny such deductions as not 
"clearly reflecting income." Cf. generally APA 8 10(e), 5 U.S.C. 8 706(2)(C) (1976) (determina- 
tion reversible if "in excess of statutory . . . limitations"). 
116. Frysinger v. Commissioner, 645 F.2d 523,527 (5th Cir. 1981). But cf. 10 Mertens Law 
of Federal Income Taxation 5 60.16 (1976 rev.) (Commissioner not bound by erroneous regula- 
tions). 
117. L. Jaffe, supra note 46, at 569-75; K. Davis, supra note 44, 8 30.04, at 550. 
118. There remains some question as to who should determine the relevant factors. In 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), the Supreme Court made its own 
inquiry into whether the agency determination was based on "relevant factors," id. a t  416, and 
the Court itself considered the proper weighting of factors according to statutory purpose, id. a t  
411-12. Nevertheless, where agency lawmaking discretion has been granted, a court might prop- 
erly limit the scope of review of an agency definition of legally relevant factors to a consideration 
of whether such factors could rationally be found legally relevant. Wong Wing Hang v. INS, 360 
F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1966) (discretion abused if decision "rested on . . . 'considerations that 
Congress could not have intended to make relevant.' " (quoting United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. 
Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489,491 (2d Cir. 1950)). See generally L. Jaffe, supra note 46, at 569-75 
(if reasonable men may differ as to purpose of statute, reasonable agency interpretation stands). 
The limited review of agency lawmaking depends on the scope of discretion granted. See generally 
Monaghan, supra note 48, at 25-31 (function of judicial review is to determine whether agency 
lawmaking is within boundaries set by Congress). While the language and history of 8 446@) are 
ambiguous as to whether the Commissioner has discretion to define the "clearly reflect income" 
test, or merely to apply it, supra text accompanying notes 53-61, cases decided under 8 446(b) 
tend to inquire into the meaning and legislative purpose of the "clearly reflect income" language. 
See discussion of Automobile Club of Michigan, 353 U.S. 180 (1957); American Automobile 
Ass'n v. United States, 309 U.S. 687 (1961); Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 
(1979). infra text accompanying notes 133-48. Thus, the same cases which find the grant of 
discretion under 8 446(b) leave authority in the courts to define the statutory language and 
determine the legally relevant factors. Of course, if a court were to find that a Commissioner 
definition of the legally relevant factors was reversible only if such factors could not have been 
based on the statute, Commissioner challenges to accounting methods could be made much more 
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which the discretion arises.Hg Thus, to define the law within which a Commis- 
sioner determination must have an "adequate basis," we turn to both the 
development of judicial doctrine and a statutory interpretation of the "clearly 
reflect income" language. 
111. EMERGING CONTENT OF "CLEARLY REFLECT INCOME" DISCRETION 
IN THE ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING CONTEXT 
An inquiry into the emerging content of the "clearly reflect income" test 
reveals a shift from the early definition of tax accounting "income," which 
identified it with financial accounting income, to a definition of tax account- 
ing income that explicitly recognizes the incompatibility of financial account- 
ing income with tax accounting goals. This new definition recognizes as a 
significant factor of tax accounting the "responsibility of the Internal Reve- 
nue Service . . . to protect the public fisc."lZ0 Implicit in this doctrine is 
recognition of considerations of tax equity in the discretionary application of 
the "clearly reflect income" test. Under such an approach, the defeat of 
horizontal equity through the manipulation of an accounting method may be 
the Commissioner's "rational basis" for disallowing such an accounting 
method. 
A. Rejecting "lncome" According to GAAP 
1. Judicial Doctrine from Anderson to Thor. Judicial parsing of the 
"clearly reflect income" language originally focused on the "clearly reflect" 
portion of the test. In early decisions, the concept of "income" was assumed 
to be equivalent to the financial accounting definition of income. 
The seminal accrual accounting case, United States v. A n d e r s ~ n , ~ ~ '  is the 
basis for this notion of financial and tax accounting "income" equivalency. 
In Anderson, the Court interpreted section 13(d) of the 1916 Act.lZ2 This 
section for the first time specifically authorized accrual accounting for tax 
purposes by providing that tax accounting be according to the taxpayer's book 
method. In applying accrual tax accounting concepts to the timing of a 
deduction for munitions taxes not payable until the year after the activity, and 
of income that gave rise to the tax, the Court required "scientific accounting 
principles . . . [of] charging against income earned during the taxable period 
. . . the expenses incurred in and properly attributable to the process of 
earning income during that period."lZ3 The Court thus stated the "matching 
easily. This Note will assume the less deferential standard of review in which the court defines 
which factors are legally relevant. 
119. L. Jaffe, supra note 46, at 181, 570-73. 
120. Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522. 542 (1979). 
. . 
121. 269 U.S. 422 (1926). 
122. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463,s 13(d), 39 Stat. 756,771 (repealed 1918). This section is 
a ~redecessor of the current 5 446(b). See supra note 56. . . 
123. 269 U.S. at 440. 
Heinonline - -  83 Colum. L. Rev. 398 1983 
19831 ACCRUAL ABUSE 399 
principle" of accrual accounting, a concept of income that is consonant with 
financial accounting g0a1s.l~~ 
Thus the definition of income seemed settled as the matching of ex- 
penses with revenues generated from the period's activities. Such a conception 
of income had great staying power, but was destined to prove unworkable for 
tax accounting purposes. Litigation in the circuits following Anderson illus- 
trates the problems with a "matching" concept of tax income. With the 
construction of the "income" language settled, such litigation tended to focus 
on the "clearly reflect" portion of the test. When confronted with the tension 
between a Revenue Act that seemed to authorize cash-receipts-and-disburse- 
ments accounting and the fact that the cash method rarely, if ever, properly 
matches income and expenses, the Ninth Circuit parsed its way out of the 
problem with the "clearly reflect" language in Osterloh v. L u c a ~ . ' ~ ~  It decided 
that no "literal construction [of 'clearly reflect'] was contemplated . . . . [A111 
that is meant is that the books shall be kept fairly and honestly . . . . ~ ~ 1 2 8  ~h~ 
Sixth Circuit, in Huntington Securities Corp. v. Busey,12' further minced 
the "clearly reflect" language: "'Clearly,' as used in the statute, means 
plainly, honestly, straightforwardly and frankly, but does not mean 'accu- 
rately' . . ."128.B~t he Second Circuit, struck by a sense that congress could 
not have intended that good faith but wholly inaccurate accounting methods 
pass for tax purposes, decided in Caldwell -v. Cornrni~sioner'~~ to "read 
'clearly reflect the income' . . . to mean rather [than good faith,] that income 
should be reflected with as much accuracy as standard methods of accounting 
practice permit. "130 
This last excerpt reflects an adherence to a "standard methods" of 
financial accounting concept of income, comprehending the matching princi- 
ple. The staying power of the Anderson decision helped cause the difficulty in 
construing the "clearly reflect" language of the test. Yet even while the 
circuits were struggling to reconcile the "clearly reflect" language with a 
matching concept of income, the Supreme Court was backing off from a strict 
124. The government, the prevailing party, cited in its brief two financial accounting texts 
and one tax accounting text. Id. at 425. For a current statement of the matching principle as a 
"pemasive principle" of GAAP, see American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, APB 
Statement No. 4 11 154-161 (October, 1970), reprinted in Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
Financial Accounting Standards: Original Pronouncements as of July 1, 1976 at 466-67 (1976) 
[hereinafter cited as APB Statement No. 41. Cf. H. Finney and R. Oldberg, Lawyer's Guide to 
Accounting 79-80, 90, 94-95 (1955) (matching principle fundamental to financial ac'counting). 
The decision in favor of financial accounting in Anderson went against the taxpayer, who 
sought a later accrual of the munitions tax to offset the higher income tax rates. Cf. Miller & 
Vidor Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 890,892 (5th Cir. 1930), where the Fifth Circuit also 
applied financial accounting matching to reject a taxpayer's attempt to defer an expense to a more 
highly taxed year. 
125. 37 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1930). 
126. Id. at 278. 
127. 112 F.2d 368 (6th Cir. 1940). 
128. Id. at 370. 
129. 202 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1953). 
130. Id. at 115. 
H e i n o n l i n e  - -  8 3  C o l u m .  L. R e v .  3 9 9  1 9 8 3  
400 COLUMBIA LA W REVIE W [Vol. 83:378 
matching principle. In North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet,I3' the 
Court held that the time the right to receive revenues matures determines the 
taxable year of inclusion rather than the year the expenditures and activities 
producing the revenues occurred, hinting that ability to pay was more impor- 
tant than matching in tax "income."132 
A more explicit rejection of the financial accounting "matching" concep- 
tion of income was not to come until the Supreme Court decided American 
Automobile Association v. United States (AAA)133 in 1961. Prior to AAA, 
several circuits had upheld the use of accounting methods that deferred tax 
recognition of income already received in cash until the year in which the 
properly matched expenses were to be incurred.134 Four years prior to AAA, 
in Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner (Mi~higan), '~~ the Court 
had rejected such an accounting method on the ground that the "pro rata 
allocation of the membership dues . . . is purely artificial and bears no 
relation to the services" that produce the income.138 But it is not clear from 
the holding in Michigan whether the Court was rejecting the financial ac- 
counting matching principle or rejecting the taxpayer's factual basis for 
matching revenues with expenses.137 
AAA involved the same accounting practice that the Court rejected in 
Michigan. That the identical issue required Supreme Court consideration four 
years later demonstrates the ambiguity in the Michigan holding. The taxpay- 
er's attempt to distinguish Michigan highlights the confusion about whether 
the "clearly reflect income" test turned on "clearly reflect" or on "income." 
The AAA taxpayer sought to distinguish Michigan on the ground that AAA's 
accounting method was more "clear9'-that is, the method in fact accorded 
with the financial accounting concept of revenues-matched-with-expenses in- 
come based on statistical experience.13* The AAA taxpayer saw no need to 
show that the income clearly reflected by financial accounting systems was the 
131. 286 U.S. 417 (1932). 
132. Other Supreme Court decisions indicating that activity matching was not the only 
principle of tax "income" include Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 303 U.S. 493 (1938) 
(recognition upon receipt or accrual, regardless of timing of associated activities); Continental Tie 
& Lumber Co. v. United States, 286 U.S. 290 (1932) (income recognized at genesis of right to 
receive). Cf. Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271 (1938) (matching revenues and expenses of entire 
protracted transaction does not affect taxation of results of particular period); Burnet v. Sanford 
& Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931) (same). 
133. 367 U.S. 687 (1961). 
134. Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959) (television service 
contracts) (citing Anderson); Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956) (furnace 
service contracts); Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955) 
(prepaid newspaper subscriptions, recognition of income deferred until year of delivery). 
135. 353 U.S. 180 (1957). 
136. Id. at  189. 
137. The Court distinguished Beacon and Schuessler, while expressing no opinion on their 
merits, on the ground that the certainty that services would later be performed was greater in 
those cases. Id. at  189 n.20. This distinction reinforces the ambiguity of the holding, since, if 
valid, the taxpayer need only show the greater certainty of the associated expenses-i.e., more 
proper matching. 
138. 367 U.S. at  691. Note the taxpayer reliance on accounting testimony. 
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same "income" intended to be clearly reflected for tax purposes. The Court 
found these clear-reflection arguments irrelevant, a finding that must be read 
as a redefinition of the "income" concept.130 The Court expressly repudiated 
the notion that financial accounting "income" was controlling for tax pur- 
poses.140 While the holding was not explicit in its rejection of the matching 
principle,141 clearly the matching principle as applied by financial accounting 
was rejected along with the idea that tax "income" was the same as financial 
income. Two years later, in Schlude v. Cornrni~sioner,~~~ the Court again 
considered a prepaid income deferral accounting method that was claimed to 
have sufficient factual basis to invoke the matching principle, and again 
rejected it.143 
The recognition that the financial accounting concept of income did not 
control the construction of section 446(b) "income" for tax purposes, implicit 
in the AAA decision, was made explicit in Thor Power Tool: 
[Tlhe presumption petitioner postulates [that GAAP clearly reflects 
income] is insupportable in light of the vastly different objectives 
that financial and tax accounting have. The primary goal of finan- 
cial accounting is to provide useful information to management, 
shareholders, creditors, and others properly interested; the major 
responsibility of the accountant is to protect these parties from being 
misled. The primary goal of the income tax system, in contrast, is 
the equitable collection of revenue; the major responsibility of the 
Internal Revenue Service is to protect the public fisc . . . . In view of 
the Treasury's markedly different goals and responsibilities, under- 
statement of income is not destined to be its guiding light.144 
J 
139. Id. at  692. The Court does invoke the "clearly reflect" language by referring to the 
"clarity of an accounting system," id., but the rejection of financial accounting matching 
principles is best read as a redefinition of "income." By exalting the certainty requirement over 
the matching principle, AAA's tax accounting requirement is at  odds with the financial account- 
ing approach to income and the matching concept. 
As an alternative holding, the Court found that the deferrals sought were barred by congres- 
sional intent in repealing $5 452 and 462 of the 1954 Code, which would have expressly allowed 
such deferrals. The Court seemed particularly influenced by the magnitude of the loss to the 
Treasury which would be caused by such a rule. Id. at  694-97. 
140. Id. at  692-93. 
141. Whether some less rigorous tax matching principle remains is ambiguous, since the 
Court again distinguishes Beacon and Schuessler "on the same grounds which made them 
distinguishable in [Michigan]." Id. at  691 n.4. (citation omitted). 
142. 372 U.S. 128 (1963). 
143. In Schlude, a franchise dance instructor deferred recognition of income for lessons 
contracted for and prepaid until the lessons were actually requested. The Court again rejected the 
putative matching expenses as too uncertain, since the lessons might be forfeited if not demanded. 
Id. at  135. While the holding implies that the matching has some relevance for tax purposes, it is 
not the same matching principle that applies for financial purposes, which demands less certainty. 
The tenacity of the GAAP matching principle in income tax accounting, even after the AAA 
and Schlude decisions, is demonstrated by Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1367 
(Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1976), where the Courtbf Claims rejected the Commission- 
er's disallowance of the taxpayer's GAAP based income deferral accounting method. 
A further withdrawal from financial accounting principles is evidenced in Frank Lyon Co. v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978), where the Court found that the financial accounting charac- 
terization of a transaction did not control for tax purposes. Id. at  577. 
144. 439 U.S. 523, 542 (1979). 
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The implication of the passage goes further than a rejection of the taxpayer's 
accounting method; it is a statement that the financial accounting concept of 
income, based on entirely different goals, has little to do with the tax statute 
concept of income. 
2. Income After Thor: An Index of Taxpaying Ability. The Michigan-to- 
Thor line of cases appears more consistent when read as defining the tax 
concept of income rather than as passing on the technical accuracy of an 
accounting method in reflecting an assumed financial accounting concept of 
income. By focusing on the "clearly reflect" question and avoiding the 
"What is income?" question, the taxpayer litigants in AAA and Schlude were 
barking up the wrong tree. But these cases do more than simply reject finan- 
cial accounting income; they articulate an affirmative notion of what tax 
accounting income is. 
This notion of tax "income," pursuing the goal of the "equitable collec- 
tion of the revenue," comprehends the consideration of horizontal and verti- 
cal equity. The inclusion of horizontal equity as a tax income consideration is 
evidenced by the Court's concern in Thor that financial accounting principles, 
which allow many choices in treatment, would give the taxpayer too much 
latitude to choose his tax: 
Variances of this sort . . . are questionable in a tax system designed 
to ensure as far as possible that similarly situated taxpayers pay the 
same tax. If management's election among "acceptable" options 
were dispositive for tax purposes, a firm, indeed, could decide uni- 
laterally-within limits dictated only by its accountants-the tax it 
wished to pay. Such unilateral decisions would . . . make the Code 
inequitable . . . . 145 
That this tax "income" doctrine also considers vertical equity relevant is 
evidenced by the Court's holdings severely limiting deferrals of income re- 
ceived in Michigan, AAA, and Schlude. A taxpayer who has received cash in 
the current year has more ability to pay tax than one who has not, even though 
the cash received is associated with a promise to perform future services. 
Though it would be misleading to investors to recognize income currently that 
will not be earned until a later year, horizontal and vertical equity require a 
taxpayer with cash in pocket to share that cash with the government cur- 
r e n t l ~ . l ~ ~  This concern for taxation based on current ability to pay is reflected 
145. Id. a t  544. An economic efficiency analysis of the Thor case is intriguing, since the 
transaction giving rise to  the deduction was a paper book entry. However, this book entry, 
seemingly encouraged by the tax law, would affect Thor's financial statements and thus might 
affect transactions with the owners. The tax benefit sought might also influence the size of the 
planned overrun of spare parts, since the manufacturer expected the tax law to subsidize part of 
the cost of the overrun. By disallowing the write-down, the Court removed the uneconomic 
incentive. 
146. Perfect equity, however, might allow such a taxpayer to reduce his taxable income by 
the estimated future expenses associated with this income. Otherwise, a taxpayer who receives 
$100 in income this year subject to no promise is treated the same as a taxpayer receiving $100 
subject to  a promise to perform expensive services next year, though their taxpaying abilities 
differ. Such accruals normally fail the "all events" test for current deductions, and are not 
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in the AAA Court's requirement of a stronger showing that expenses are 
properly matched for tax purposes than for financial purposes where "an 
accounting system . . . defers receipt" (receipt meaning re~ognition) '~~ of cash 
that is in the possession of the taxpayer.14s 
Thus the divergence between tax "income" and financial income may be 
defined: financial income is intended to be a comparative measure of a year's 
results, allowing an outsider, with the benefit of elaborate disclosure of 
accounting practices, to compare the results of different periods or different 
~ rgan iza t ions .~~~  Tax "income," on the other hand, is intended to be an index 
of a taxpayer's current ability to pay tax. Disclosure of accounting practices 
will protect users of financial statements, but such disclosure cannot protect 
the tax system, which takes income as an absolute. Transactions such as 
advance receipt of income and deferral of expenses, while not affecting the 
comparative measure of period performance, do affect the index of ability to 
pay taxes implicit in tax "income." An explicit application of this ability-to- 
pay concept may be seen in RCA Corp. v. United StateslsO where the Second 
Circuit rejected an income deferral accounting method on the principle that 
"[tlax accounting . . . tends to compute taxable income on the basis of the 
taxpayer's present ability to pay the tax, as manifested by his current cash 
flow."lS1 The case law thus relates tax "income" to ability to pay. 
B. Legislative History and Tax Equity 
The concept of tax "income" as an index of ability to pay taxls2 has 
support in the legislative history of the income tax. The original income tax, 
passed in 1913, and the sixteenth amendment, which authorized it, were a 
response to the perceived unfairness of the then current system of raising 
revenues through tariffs on goods. The poor and the working class were seen 
to be shouldering a disproportionate burden of the tariff on consumption 
goods; the income tax was intended to shift a fair share of the burden to the 
wealthy.ls3 Implicit in this purpose is the notion of vertical equity, that those 
with a greater ability to pay should pay a greater tax. According to the House 
allowed. E.g., Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 323 U.S. 780 (1944). However, deductions for a reserve to cover these expenses may be 
allowable. See 4 Federal Taxes (P-H) q 20,577 (1982) and cases cited therein. 
147. 367 U.S. at 692. 
148. Accord Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400, 408 (5th Cir. 1969) 
("Schlude and AAA, however, have significance far beyond their particular facts" and call into 
question all deferrals and accruals.). 
149. APB Statement No. 4, supra note 124, at 11 93, 95-106. 
150. 664 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2958 (1982). 
151. Id. at 888. 
152. "Income" might more precisely be called an index of increase in ability to pay tax, since 
an index based on either wealth or consumption may also be said to reflect taxpaying ability. See 
R. Musgrave & P. Musgrave, supra note 6, at 242-90. 
153. See H.R. Rep. No. 416,62d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1912); H.R. Rep. No. 5,63d Cong., 1st 
Sess. xxxvi-ix (1913). 
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Report on the 1913 Act, "The tax upon incomes is levied according to the 
ability to pay . . . . 9,154 
If a tax upon incomes is a tax upon ability to pay, tax "income" must be 
an index of ability to pay. The language of the 1913 Act supports such a 
reading. "Income" in its first appearance is used in the context of the compu- 
tation of the tax: "That there shall be levied, assessed, collected and paid 
annually upon the entire net income . . . a tax of one per centum per annum 
upon such income."155 The current Code continues this conception of "in- 
come"; ultimately "taxable income" is the index upon which the tax is 
based.ls6 
This tax equity is part of the "clear purpose" of the tax law.15' Thus the 
Commissioner ought to be able to consider the taxpayer's relative ability to 
pay tax when making a clearly-reflects-income determination. Even if the 
Commissioner's discretion is limited to passing on the technical accuracy of 
the accounting method in its application, vertical equity, and hence taxpaying 
ability, is a relevant consideration in determining whether "income" is clearly 
reflected. When reviewing the Commissioner's determination that an account- 
ing method does not "clearly reflect income," courts should treat the "in- 
come" language as an index of taxpaying ability, to be determined without 
reference to financial accounting rules, which are designed for comparative 
purposes. An accounting method is thus acceptable only insofar as it reflects 
current ability to pay tax without regard to an attempt to match current with 
future expenses that do not affect current taxpaying ability. 
Such an "income" standard allocates the roles of reviewing court and 
agency according to their expertise. Thus read, the Michigan-AAA-Schlude- 
Thor line of cases interprets the legal construction of the section 446(b) 
"income" language. The Commissioner's role under section 446(b) is to 
determine whether the accounting system used, as applied, reflects this tax 
definition of income; and it is thus the Commissioner, and not the court, that 
weighs the relative merits of accounting systems. The courts simply set the 
legal goals of the accounting system. To disallow an accounting application, 
the Commissioner need only show the reason why the method tended not to 
reflect taxpaying ability. Or, to rephrase the same test, disallowance of an 
154. H.R. Rep. No. 5, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. xxxvii (1913). 
155. Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 16,s  IIA, subd. 1,38 Stat. 114, 166 (repealed 1916). 
That "income" was meant as a measurement of taxpaying ability, rather than a taxable corpus, 
see Opinions of the Honourable John K. Shields, Hon. Cordell Hull, and Thurlow M. Gordon, 
Special Assistant to the Attorney General on the Proposed Income Tax Provisions of the Pending 
Tariff Bill, S. Doc. No. 171,63d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1913) (statement of M. Gordon). Gordon's 
opinion was rendered in opposition to an amendment which would have barred retroactive effect 
of the Act. The amendment was not adopted. 
156. I.R.C. 1 (1976). Of course, "income" as an index of taxpaying ability is (and always 
has been) modified by the tax subsidy provisions of the Code. See supra text accompanying note 
9. Even the 1913 Act exempted from income interest on state issued bonds. Revenue Act of 1913, 
Pub. L. No. 16, 5 IIB, 38 Stat. 114, 167 (repealed 1916). 
157. See supra text accompanying note 50. 
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accounting method that defeats tax equity accords with the "clear purpose" 
of the tax statute, and is thus proper as a matter of agency "legal" discretion. 
Thus, abuse itself becomes a ground for disallowing an accounting method.15s 
The next step is to apply this analysis where the accounting practice 
challenged undeniably satisfies the technical rules of a tax accounting method, 
a situation indistinguishable in principle from the Michigan-AAA-Schlude- 
Thor line of cases.159 
IV. COMMISSIONER DISCRETION AND A TAXPAYING ABILITY CONCEPT 
OF ' L I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ "  APPLIED TO ACCRUAL ABUSE 
A. "Abuse" Standard and Tax Equity 
As demonstrated, an accounting method may be disallowed if it does not 
reflect "income," defined as ability to pay tax, thus comprehending tax 
equity. Such a disallowance is desirable since it is an effective weapon against 
taxpayer abuse through manipulation of accounting method. The definition 
of tax shelter abuse offered earlierleO demonstrates the consonance between 
tax equity and tax shelter abuse, abuse defined as the defeat of horizontal or 
vertical equity without participation in a tax favored activity. 
Under the section 446(b) analysis suggested, a tax shelter transaction 
defeating horizontal or vertical equity that depends on the application of a 
particular accounting method would be subject to disallowance as not reflect- 
ing ability to pay tax. Where the defeat of vertical equity results from partici- 
pation in an activity qualifying for an intentional tax subsidy, the accounting 
method would not be subject to disallowance since the Commissioner's discre- 
tion is limited by specific provisions of the Code and regulati~ns. '~~ 
B.  Disallowance of Accrual Accounting 
1 .  Application of Taxpaying Ability Analysis. The suggested taxpaying 
ability approach to section 446(b) discretion is consistent with the cases apply- 
ing the "clearly reflect income" test to disallow cash accounting. The Burck 
court, for example, considered the capital gains income the taxpayer sought to 
offset with a substantial interest prepayment to be " 'real' income which 
should properly be reflected in taxpayer's tax liability."le2 Thus the "income" 
that was "materially distorted" by cash accounting in that case was viewed as 
the taxpayer's ability to pay tax, which included the capital gains income. The 
"materially distorts income" test was applied even though the rules of an 
authorized accounting method were strictly followed. 
158. That is, abuse as the defeat of tax equity. See supra text accompanying notes 10-16. 
159. As noted above, supra note 82, Michigan, AAA, and Schlude may be read as cases 
dealing with the proper time for recognizing income under the accrual method, rather than as 
cases rejecting the accrual method itself in the particular application. 
160. See supra text accompanying notes 133-44. 
161. See supra text accompanying notes 115-16. 
162. Burck v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 768, 772 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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Decisions dealing with cash accounting may on their face be weak prece- 
dent, though, for the disallowance of accrual accounting as not clearly reflec- 
tive of income. Both courtsle3 and the Codele4 have historically viewed the 
cash method as a sacrifice in accuracy for the sake of simplicity of tax 
accounting for relatively unsophisticated taxpayers. The tenacious GAAP 
conformity argument cuts against the cash method, since cash accounting is 
not ordinarily acceptable for financial purposes.lo5 Thus, when the recognized 
inaccuracies of the cash method are manipulated by relatively sophisticated 
taxpayers,le6 courts may be more willing to throw out an otherwise permissible 
cash accounting method than an accrual method, or at least find a "reason- 
able basis" to do so.lo7 
Yet this distinction is valid only insofar as the cash method is, in fact, 
inherently more subject to manipulation than the accrual method. As demon- 
strated, the accrual method is also subject to manipulation. Accordingly, the 
"material distortion of income"168 standard developed as a test of abuse 
under the cash method ought equally to apply to accrual accounting. This test 
accords with Commissioner discretion under a tax equity conception of sec- 
tion 446(b) "income." 
When the test is applied to the specific abuses of accrual accounting 
considered earlier, the Commissioner's authority to disallow accrual account- 
ing becomes apparent. In the situations of both the advance accrual of de- 
ferred rent at full value and the Rule of 78s interest amortization, the differ- 
ence between the present value of the payment due and the dollar amount of 
163. United States v. Catto, 384 U.S. 102, 110-11, 116 (1966) ("sacrifice in accounting 
accuracy under the cash method represents an historic concession . . . to provide . . . for farmers 
and ranchers in need of a simplified accounting procedure"); Frysinger v. Commissioner, 645 
F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Catto; cash method as "historic concession for farmers"). 
Cf. Osterloh v. Lucas, 37 F.2d 277, 278 (9th Cir. 1930) (recognition that cash method rarely 
reflects income). 
164. Compare the 1916 Act committee report language: 
As two systems of bookkeeping are in use in the United States, one based on the 
cash or receipt basis and the other on the accrual basis, it was deemed advisable to 
provide in the proposed measure that [a taxpayer] may make return[s] . . . on either the 
cash or accrued basis . . . . 
H.R. Rep. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1916), with the 1954 Code committee reports: 
In the case of a taxpayer whose sole income is wages, duplicate tax returns or other 
records may be sufficient to  constitute the use of the method of accounting. . . . Thus, 
the great bulk of such taxpayers who file returns on the cash basis will be considered to 
be using that method and hence ordinarily not subject to having their income computed 
on a basis which the Secretary or his delegate determines will clearly reflect income. 
House Report, supra note 55, at  A157, reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4017, 
4296; Senate Report, supra note 55, at  299, reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. &Ad. News 4621, 
4939. 
165. APB Statement No. 4, supra note 123, 125.  
166. See Burck v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d. 768,769 (2d Cir. 1976) ("This case arises out of 
the ever-present potential for arbitrariness and evasiveness which is inherent in the cash-basis 
method of income tax accounting."). 
167. See supra text accompanying note 23, (citing Burck v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 768,773 
(2d Cir. 1976)). 
168. See Burck v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 768, 773 (2d Cir. 1976); supra note 23 and cases 
cited therein. 
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the current deduction taken demonstrates that "income" so computed does 
not reflect the taxpaying ability of those similarly situated.lBg The defeat of 
horizontal equity is a sufficient "reasonable basis" for the disallowance of 
accrual accounting as not clearly reflecting income in this situation. The 
Commissioner could thus require cash accounting for this item.170 
The application of such a horizontal equity test is consistent with the 
result, if not the reasoning, of the Mooney case. While the Fifth Circuit there 
did not consider the diminished present value of the aircraft retirement 
"bonds" accrued, clearly a promise to pay $1,000 approximately twenty years 
later did not reduce the manufacturer's current ability to pay tax as much as a 
current $1,000 expense. The Mooney court was correct in finding the delay in 
payment of the obligation "too long," but its reliance on the diminished 
likelihood of payment was not the best ground for this finding. 
2. Accrual Accounting Tax Subsidy. Determining that horizontal equity 
is defeated is but half the inquiry into whether tax equity is defeated and an 
accrual accounting method does not clearly reflect income. An accounting 
system may defeat horizontal equity but still be acceptable if the inequity is 
due to a specific tax subsidy provision of the Code, or possibly the regula- 
tions. But can the use of an accounting method itself be a favored activity, the 
object of an effective tax subsidy? 
As surprising as this possibility sounds, such would seem to be the 
assertion of the Fifth Circuit in limiting the Commissioner's discretion to 
169. A plan such as the sale-leaseback can also defeat economic efficiency. The buyer-lessor 
may be no more efficient a manager than the seller-lessee, and, if the seller-lessee is profitable, 
may also be no more able to  take advantage of the intended tax benefits of property ownership 
such as accelerated depreciation and the Investment Tax Credit. However, with a cash method 
buyer-lessor, the value of the deferral to both parties may make such an uneconomic transaction 
post-tax advantageous to  both parties. If such a transaction takes place, economic efficiency is 
defeated. 
170. This may seem a harsh result, since even a limited matching principle and horizontal 
equity require that some account be taken of the absolute future obligation to pay money arising 
from the current year's income-producing activities. Considering the hypothetical suggested supra 
text accompanying notes 24-25, horizontal equity would require that B a t  least be given the same 
deduction as A, that is, for the $6,000 present value of his future rent payment, if we ignore B's 
increased liquidity. But cf. Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d. 400 (5th Cir. 1969) 
(liquidity considered under 5 446(b)). The Commissioner could simply require that the deduction 
be discounted; however, there might be administrative problems in determining the discount rate, 
and discounting goes more to recharacterizing a transaction than to disallowing an accounting 
method. Cf. I.R.C. 5 483 (1976) (allowing recharacterization of deferred payment sales for 
"imputed interest"). Here, an interesting interplay with avoidance intent is raised. While intent to 
avoid taxes may be irrelevant to whether income is clearly reflected, see supra text accompanying 
notes 14-16, when a taxpayer purposely structures a transaction so that neither cash nor accrual 
accounting will accurately reflect taxpaying ability, he ought to accept the risk that the Commis- 
sioner will require the accounting method which is more favorable to the government. But cf. 
Loftin & Woodard, Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1206, 1229 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[Ilt would seem 
that such a showing [of Commissioner abuse of discretion] could be predicated upon a decision to  
use an accounting method that is inaccurate under the circumstances."). Where there are nontax 
motives for the deferral, the lessee can avoid trouble by characterizing the discounted value as 
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disallow the cash accounting method to a tax-shelter farmer, in Frysinger v, 
Cornmi~sioner.'~~ The Frysinger court, while acknowledging a "distortion 
created by the deduction" for prepaid feed expenses,172 found that the distor- 
tion was intended by regulations governing "special privileges . . . with regard 
to tax accounting for farm  expenditure^."'^^ This holding may be seen as a tax 
subsidy for farming, but it is better read as a tax subsidy for simplified 
accounting methods for particular classes of taxpayers.174 
The possibility that in certain situations the inaccuracies of an accounting 
method will be tolerated as a tax subsidy for simplified accounting leads to an 
inquiry into whether accrual accounting could be thus favored in the tax 
avoidance situation being considered. Some intention to favor book account- 
ing methods, including accrual accounting methods, must be inferred from 
the section 446(a) direction that "[tlaxable income shall be computed under 
the method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly com- 
putes his income in keeping his books,"175 despite the section 446(b) "clearly 
reflect income" limitation. This inference is buttressed by the legislative his- 
tory of section 446 and its antecedents, which evidence an intent to avoid 
forcing taxpayers to keep separate books for tax ac~ounting. '~The Commit- 
tee reports to the 1954 Code, commenting on the addition of an authorization 
for hybrid accounting methods in section 4 4 6 ( ~ ) , ' ~ ~  consider the example of a 
"small retail store," which would now be specifically authorized to use its 
book accounting method for tax returns.17s It is possible, then, that an accrual 
accounting method used by a relatively unsophisticated taxpayer should stand 
up under 446(b) despite an inaccurate reflection of taxpaying ability. Such an 
accrual inaccuracy would be tolerated for the sake of accounting simplicity, 
just as the inaccuracies of the cash method are tolerated for the sake of 
accounting simplicity. 
rent, and providing for interest accruing until the obligation is paid. This characterization would 
more nearly reflect the economic reality of the deferred rental payment, and would be immune to 
Commissioner challenge as not "clearly reflecting income" under this analysis, since the dis- 
counted value accrual would not defeat horizontal equity. 
171. 645 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1981). 
172. Id. at  527. 
173. Id. at  526. 
174. See the discussion of cash accounting, supra text accompanying note 163. 
175. I.R.C. 5 446[a) (1976). 
176. See supra note 164 (quoting the 1916 Act Committee Report). Cf. United States v. 
Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 440 (1926) (purpose of section 446's predecessor "was to enablc 
taxpayers to keep their books and make their returns according to" the same principles). 
177. I.R.C. 5 446(c) (1976). 
178. 
- .  -- 
One such method, in the case of a small retail store, will be an accrual of items 
affecting gross income such as purchases, sales of goods, accounts payable, and ac- 
counts receivable . . . [while] items of deduction such as rent, interest, clerks' salaries, 
insurance and similar items may be accounted for on a cash basis. 
House Report, supra note 55, a t  A158, reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4017, 
4296; Senate Report, supra note 55, a t  300, reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. &Ad. News 4621, 
4939. 
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This "exception" to the section 446(b) exception falls apart in the case of 
taxpayers who structure transactions to exploit accrual accounting inaccura- 
cies. First, such taxpayers hardly fit into the relatively unsophisticated class 
that accounting simplicity is meant to benefit.'79 Second, accrual taxpayers 
structuring tax deferral deals are very likely to be keeping separate tax and 
financial accounting books already.lsO Finally, these long term accruals do not 
fit into the legislative purpose of accrual tax acc~unting. '~~ If the congressio- 
nal purpose is consonant with an accountant's understanding of accruals, in 
authorizing accrual accounting Congress expected most accrued expenses to 
be paid within one year of the accrual date.ls2 Thus, any legislative purpose to 
subsidize simplicity of accrual accounting methods will not come into play to 
protect the taxpayer who intentionally distorts income through long-term 
expense accruals.183 
C .  Other Discretionary Factors 
From the above, it can be seen that the primary inquiry under the section 
446(b) "clearly reflect income" test is one into tax equity: Is the "income" 
computed by the taxpayer an adequate index of taxpaying ability, and if it is 
179. But cf. Frysinger, 645 F.2d 523 (the taxpayer given the benefit of a farmer's simplified 
tax accounting method was the treasurer of U.S. Steel). 
180. See generally Weinman, Conformity of Tax and Financial Accounting, 59 Taxes 419 
(1981). 
181. Indeed, such long term undiscounted accruals may be at odds with financial accounting. 
See S. Davidson, C. Stickney, & R. Weil, Financial Accounting: An Introduction to Concepts, 
Methods, and Uses 39 (2d ed. 1979) (long term liabilities "stated at the present value of the future 
cash outflows"). But compare American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Committee on 
Accounting Procedure, Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43, ch. 3, Q A-7 (1953), reprinted in 
Financial Accounting Standards Board, Original Pronouncements as of July 1, 1976, at  13 (1976) 
(current liabilities include debts "directly related to the [current] operating cycle"), which would 
seem to place accrued expenses in the category of current liabilities not requiring discounting. 
182. S. Davidson, C. Stickney, & R. Weil, supra note 181, give as examples of "current 
liabilities . . . accounts payable to suppliers, salaries payable to  employees, and taxes payable to 
government agencies," all of which are expense items, and define "current liabilities . . . [as] 
liabilities that are expected to be paid within 1 year." Id. a t  6. On the other hand, the examples 
given of long-term liabilities are "mortgages, bonds, and [capital] leases." Id. at  364. A capital 
lease is one in which the asset is effectively purchased. Id. at  386. While it would be inaccurate to  
say that financial accounting will not recognize a current expense accrual that will not be paid for 
over a year, it is fair to say that an expectation arising from experience assumes that current 
expense accruals will be paid within a year. The dramatic increase in real interest rates since the 
original tax acts, and even the 1954 Code, have given this assumption an importance that may not 
have been realized at the time. 
183. An example of a situation where the regulations give explicit sanction for current 
deductions for long-term accruals is original issue discount bonds. Treas. Reg. $ 1.163-4(a) (1971) 
allows the issuer to amortize the bond discount currently even though payment is not made until 
retirement, which may be decades after issuance. Note, however, that cash method taxpayers 
must report the amortized discount as current income, even though not received, I.R.C. $5 1232, 
454 (1976). and that 5 231(a) of the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 
97-248, $231(a), 96 Stat. 442 (to be codified at I.R.C. Q 1232A), adds I.R.C. $ 1232A to prohibit 
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not, is the difference due to a tax-favored-activity subsidy? It has also been 
shown that current accruals at full value of payments to be made in the remote 
future would usually fail the "clearly reflect income" test as thus defined. 
This analysis suggests, however, that certain other factors may appropri- 
ately be considered by the Commissioner in exercising his discretion in pursuit 
of the purpose of the tax statute. While tax-avoidance intent is irrelevant to a 
determination of whether tax equity is defeated, it may be relevant to whether 
or not the taxpayer's use of an inaccurate book accounting method should be 
tolerated for simplicity's sake. Further, intent may be the ground for the 
exercise of a sort of prosecutorial discretion by the Commissioner in perform- 
ing his duty to "protect the public fisc." Certainly, intentionally abusive tax 
shelters pose a greater danger to the Treasury than inadvertent accounting 
inaccuracy, and the proposition that tax avoidance intent is a factor to be 
considered under section 446(b) has ample case support.ls4 
There may also be de minimis situations where, as a matter of administra- 
tive convenience, an accrual for expenses to be paid in the future will never- 
theless be allowed. The line must be drawn somewhere. Even though every 
undiscounted accrual distorts income somewhat,ls5 all liabilities to be paid 
within one or two years should probably be accruable without discount. 
Setting such a time limit has precedent in the allowance by the Commissioner 
of prepaid income deferrals of under two years after AAA and Schl~de.~~O 
The Commissioner has discretion under section 446(b) to disallow ac- 
counting methods that do not "clearly reflect income." In exercising this 
discretion, the "income" that an accounting system must "clearly reflect" is 
an index of taxpaying ability. "Income" as thus defined comprehends notions 
of equity and efficiency inherent in a system of income taxation. When the 
minor inaccuracies of an otherwise acceptable method are emphasized 
through the purposeful structuring of transactions to gain tax benefits, the 
corresponding injury to horizontal equity gives the Commissioner a "rational 
straight-line amortization of discount and require a compound interest approach that more closely 
approximates the present value of the future payment. 
184. E.g., Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 538 (1979) ("well-known 
potential for tax avoidance" of inventory accounting invokes disallowance discretion); Ferrill v. 
Commissioner, 684 F.2d 261, 264 (3d Cir. 1982) (the reason for transaction is a factor to be 
considered; tax shelter motive supports disallowance); Burck v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 768, 774 
(2d Cir. 1976) ("finding of a tax avoidance motive" supports Commissioner's disallowance). Cf. 
Frysinger v. Commissioner, 645 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1981) (transaction "for a business 
purpose and not merely tax avoidance"; taxpayer's method upheld). Under such a rule, Grand 
Ave. Motor Co. and Rev. Rul. 70-119, discussed supra note 28, would still be good law. 
185. S. Davidson, P. Stickney, & R. Weil, supra note 181, at 360. 
186. Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2 C.B. 549, 549 ("purpose . . . is to implement an administra- 
tive decision, made by the Commissioner in the exercise of his discretion under section 446 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954"). 
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basis" to exercise his discretion to disallow an accounting method. The ac- 
crual method of accounting is equally as susceptible to abuse as the cash 
method, and the "material distortion of income" doctrine for disallowing 
cash method accounting is properly extended to accrual accounting situations. 
Disallowance of such accrual abuses gives the Treasury an additional weapon 
with which to fight transactions designed to defeat the fairness of the income 
tax.ls7 
Karl S. Coplan 
187. Currently, the IRS's principal judicial weapon for fighting tax-avoidance-motivated 
transactions is the sham transaction doctrine. This doctrine has ifs origins in the case of Gregory 
v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). See generally Fuller, Business Purpose, Sham Transactions and 
the Relation of Private Law to the Law of Taxation, 37 Tul. L. Rev. 355 (1963); Gans, Re- 
examining the Sham Doctrine: When Should an Overpayment be Reflected in Basis, 30 Buff. L. 
Rev. 95, 105-09 (1981); Note, Year-End Divorce/Remarriage Schemes and the Applicability of 
the Sham Doctrine, 3 Cardozo L. Rev. 77, 87-90 (1981). 
This doctrine has been expanded in the cases of Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 
(1960). and Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966). Gregory concerned a 
corporate reorganization solely for the tax benefits, which the Court declined to recognize for tax 
purposes. Knetsch and Goldstein held that a transaction entered into without any real hope of 
economic gain apart from the tax consequences could be disregarded for tax purposes. Both cases 
involved substantial borrowing and interest prepayments with reinvestment of the loan proceeds 
in instruments bearing a lower rate of interest than the loan. Thus, the taxpayer could not hope to 
derive any real gain from the transaction other than the tax deferral from current deductions of 
interest paid and delay of income recognition until receipt in a later year. 
In another variation, the doctrine has been used to deny tax recognition to a sale-leaseback 
transaction at a grossly inflated price. Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th 
Cir. 1976). More recently, a similar attack has been made on motion picture tax shelter deals, 
based on denial of deductions for activities not entered with a profit motive under I.R.C. 5 183 
(1976). Brannen v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 471 (1982). But cf. Siege1 v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 
659 (1982) (movie tax shelter profit-motivated). 
The clear reflection of income analysis would supplement the sham transaction doctrine. The 
clear reflection of income test can be applied to defeat tax avoidance terms contained within 
transactions that would meet the tests of nontax economic motivation and reflection of economic 
reality. 
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